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The group nature of crime is one of its better-known features. Over the past few 
decades, empirical work on group crime has been dominated by an offender-based 
perspective. Yet scholars have argued that the emergence of group crime is contextua lly 
dependent on the availability, proximity, and convergence of suitable co-offenders. It is 
unlikely that these conditions are equally distributed across space and time; instead, they 
are likely influenced by socio-structural factors, such as economic hardship. This 
dissertation hypothesizes that the relationship between economic hardship and co-
offending operates through both long-and short-term impacts. In particular, long- term 
effects of economic hardship associated with increasing criminal motivation are expected 
to be positively related to the rate of co-offending and the proportion of crimes that are co-
offenses. Economic hardship is expected to lead to more contemporaneous increases in the 
levels of guardianship and a reduction in the quality of criminal targets. This short-term 
effect is expected to have an overall null relationship with the rate of co-offending, but 
should be positively related to the proportion of crimes that are co-offenses. I further 
hypothesize that these relationships will vary across instrumental and expressive crimes.  
 
 
Using incident- level data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) that has 
been aggregated to the Metropolitan Statistical Level (MSA), I evaluate the macro-level 
relationship between economic hardship and co-offending utilizing a hybrid modeling 
strategy that combines fixed and random effects estimators. The results from these analyses 
suggest that the long-term effect associated with increases in economic hardship are 
positively and strongly related to the rate and proportion of instrumental and expressive 
crimes that are co-offenses. There is mixed evidence in support of the hypothesized 
relationships relating the short-term effect associated with economic hardship and the 
rate/proportion of instrumental and expressive crimes that are co-offenses. Across these 
results, there is variation in the extent to which the age-distribution of an MSA moderates 
the relationship between economic hardship and group crime. The theoretical implicat ions 
and limitations of this dissertation are discussed in the context of the broader literature 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Scholars have long recognized the group nature of crime.  More than a century ago, 
Breckenridge and Abbott (1912: 35) argued that “there is scarcely a type of delinquent boy 
who is not associated with others in his wrongdoing” and subsequent work has confirmed 
the high prevalence of co-offending (Carrington, 2009; McCarthy, Hagan, & Lawrence, 
1998; McGloin & Nguyen, 2012; Warr, 2002; Wright & Decker, 1994). Still, co-offending 
or group crime (i.e., when two or more people commit crime together) has often been 
overlooked and relegated to a mere descriptive feature of crime and offending, which has 
resulted in relatively limited research on the process and impact of criminal cooperation. 
More recent research has sought to make sense of the regularity of co-offending and found 
it has important implications for a variety of behavioral outcomes. For instance, scholars 
observe that co-offending experience leads to an increase in the likelihood of recidivism, 
engaging in more serious criminal behavior, and further embeddedness in crimina l 
networks (Alarid, Burton, & Hochstetler, 2009; Bouchard & Nguyen, 2010; Carrington, 
2009; Conway & McCord 2002; Felson, 2009; McGloin & Piquero, 2010; Stolzenberg & 
D’Alessio, 2008). Despite the growth in co-offending research over the past two decades, 
our understanding of group crime is still in its nascent stages and there remain a number of 
challenges that need to be addressed to advance the field. Perhaps most notably, there has 
been a nearly exclusive focus on individual-level analyses of co-offending. Individual level 
analyses are undeniably important, but research has generally failed to consider  




 The focus on individual-level analyses of co-offending has been driven in part by a 
limited supply of data that hinders evaluating co-offending from different perspectives. 
Existing research has primarily relied on surveys or narrative data among select samples 
of offenders and largely relied on offender perceptions of the value of criminal accomplices 
(e.g., Clarke & Cornish, 1985; Jacobs & Wright, 2010; Hochstetler, 2001; McCarthy et al., 
1998; Wright & Decker, 1997). Prior work on co-offending is also affected by a range of 
other limitations. Given the nature of narrative or survey data among offenders, an 
offender’s post-hoc interpretation of co-offending experiences may affect responses about 
the value and role of co-offenders. Additionally, the scope of much prior work has been 
limited to juvenile delinquency, has been largely gender-specific, and often has been 
limited to a single or small range of offenses (see discussion in van Mastrigt & Farrington, 
2009). Several studies have used official records (e.g., McCord & Conway, 2002; McGloin 
& Piquero, 2010; Ouellet, Boivin, Leclerc, & Morselli, 2013; Reiss & Farrington, 1991), 
but they suffer from limitations due to the underreporting of criminal acts and questions 
about how accurately events that involve more than one offender are identified (e.g., 
Schaefer et al., 2014; Tillyer & Tillyer, 2015). For instance, Tillyer and Tillyer (2015) 
evaluated robbery incidents using NIBRS and acknowledged that in addition to issues 
related to reporting compliance with NIBRS, roughly 40% of robberies in the United States 
are not reported to law enforcement (see also Baumer & Lauritsen, 2010). The limitat ions 
associated with both the type of data and methods used to capture and understand co-
offending likely underestimate the extent of co-offending and present a potentially narrow 
view on the implications of co-offending.  
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Even among studies that examine similar research questions, differences in 
conclusions have emerged, raising concerns over the extent to which the current co-
offending literature provides enough consistent evidence to generalize findings about the 
nature of co-offending. For instance, McCarthy et al. (1998) found that, despite the inherent 
risks associated with co-offending among street youth, experiencing adversity (e.g., failure 
to find safe shelter, nutritional sustenance) led to a greater willingness to co-offend. In an 
extension of this work, Nguyen and McGloin (2013) evaluated the adversity hypothesis 
among two samples of incarcerated offenders and found less consistent evidence. These 
divergent findings may be due to differences in the sample (street youth vs. incarcerated 
offenders) and measures used (i.e., perceptions of adversity vs. objective measures of 
adversity).  In any case, they are reflective of the fragmented depictions of co-offending 
provided by individual-level studies. In lieu of continuing the status quo in co-offending 
research, perhaps by turning to largely underexplored hypotheses at a unit of analysis other 
than at the level of individual offenders, we can expand upon our understanding of the 
emergence of co-offending and provide additional evidence to help contextua lize 
conclusions drawn from existing co-offending research.  
Theoretical and empirical work examining the processes associated with engaging 
in group crime have resided in individual-level explanations.  However, there is reason to 
believe that this process is also situated within a broader context (e.g., Felson, 2003; 
Tremblay, 1993). It is hypothesized that the emergence of group crime is conditioned by 
the availability, proximity, and convergence of potentially ‘suitable’ co-offenders (Felson, 
2003; Tremblay, 1993). The identification of individuals willing to cooperate and deemed 
suitable accomplices may be an arduous process for some offenders, as research has 
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demonstrated the brevity of co-offending relationships and the immense uncertainty that 
accompanies taking on criminal accomplices (McCarthy et al., 1998; McGloin et al. 2008; 
Weerman, 2003). Indeed, Wright and Decker’s (1997) interviews with burglars highlighted 
the ever-present threat of duplicity that accompanies taking on a co-offender. One burglar 
summarized this potential risk by stating, “[My co-offenders] would probably tell on me, 
but, to be honest, I’d probably tell on them too” (Wright & Decker, 1997: 154). Still, 
criminal cooperation occurs with regularity despite the potential hazards associated in 
doing so (Bruinsma & Bernasco, 2004; Coleman, 1990; Lin 1999; McCarthy et al., 1998).  
Despite the uncertainties associated with co-offending, certain social conditions 
experienced by offenders actually may facilitate mutual collaboration and trust between 
offenders (McCarthy et al., 1998; Shover, 1991; Tremblay, 1993). For instance, McCarthy 
et al. (1998) found evidence supporting the hypothesis that under conditions of adversity 
or desperation, individuals were more willing to collaborate with others. Individua l 
experiences of adversity are likely conditioned by the socio-structural conditions that an 
individual belongs to, as factors that produce adversity are not equally distributed 
throughout society. This suggests that access to individuals who are willing to engage in 
cooperative criminal action is also conditioned by the surrounding context (e.g., D’Alessio 
& Stolzenberg, 2010; Schaefer et al., 2014). Ultimately, variation in the prevalence of co-
offending and overall proportion of crime that is committed in groups may be influenced 
by broader contextual factors that facilitate the convergence of conditions necessary for 
this type of behavior to occur and increase the motivation to take on accomplices (Alarid 
et al., 2009; Hochstetler, 2001; McGloin et al., 2008; Warr, 1996, 2001). 
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Tremblay (1993) speculates that economic hardship, as measured by macro-level 
unemployment, should influence the emergence of co-offending. Because of the increased 
leisure time due to unemployment, there should be an increase in the availabil ity, 
proximity, and convergence of potential offenders. As more individuals become 
unemployed, crime may be viewed as a viable option to make ends meet and to the extent 
that finding a suitable co-offender takes time, unemployment increases the amount of 
leisure time that may be used to search for co-offenders (Tremblay, 1993). If the density 
and concentration of motivated offenders is a function of unemployment, this may lead to 
an increased interaction between offenders and commission of criminal opportunit ies 
among multiple offenders. Determining whether offenders actually engage in more co-
offenses as a result of the effect of unemployment is an empirical question that will be 
tested by this dissertation. 
Economic hardship may also result in a reduction in the quantity or quality of 
criminal opportunities, leading some offenders to consider working together to target more 
lucrative opportunities generally or to leverage criminal connections to facilitate access to 
opportunities (e.g., Cohen & Felson, 1979; Tremblay, 1993). Consistent with hypotheses 
derived from routine activity theory, unemployment alters the criminal ‘target backcloth’ 
by increasing levels of guardianship and altering the spatial opportunity structure of 
suitable targets (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1993; Cohen & Felson, 1979). 
Collaboration with co-offenders can expand of awareness spaces of more suitable crimina l 
opportunities, provide access to criminal networks, and allow offenders to share the 
practical demands associated with committing a crime (Andresen & Felson, 2010, 2012). 
Additionally, the incentives derived from co-offending may help overcome the increased 
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risks, fear, and costs attributed to heightened guardianship (Cusson, 1993; McGloin & 
Thomas, 2016).  Thus, the contextual influence of economic hardship may generate 
behavioral settings that promote co-offending as a viable ‘action alternative’ (Wikström, 
2006; Wikström & Svensson, 2010).  
Still, Tremblay’s (1993) arguments rest on relatively underspecified assumptions 
about the precise mechanisms that characterize the relationship between unemployment 
and co-offending. Extant literature analyzing the impact of unemployment on crime offers 
some guidance for fully exploring how it might be related to co-offending (Andresen, 2015; 
Arvanites & Defina, 2006; Cantor & Land, 1985; Chiricos, 1987; Levitt, 2001; Raphael & 
Winter-Ebmer, 2001). Cantor and Land (1985) specified that some of the weak or non-
significant results observed in studies evaluating the relationship between unemployment 
and crime occurred because two processes that comprised the total effect canceled 
themselves out. Specifically, Cantor and Land (1985) argued that the two mechanisms 
through which unemployment impacted crime were: 1) a system activity or “motivat ion” 
effect, and 2) a guardianship effect. These scholars argued that whereas the lagged effect 
of economic hardship on motivation increased crime, the contemporaneous influence of 
increased guardianship generated by unemployment led to a reduction in crime (Cantor & 
Land, 1985). Thus, to fully specify the crime (and group crime) relationship with economic 
hardship, it is necessary to tease apart processes that are temporally and substantive ly 
distinct. 
The relationship between crime and economic hardship further varies across 
important socio-structural characteristics and the crime type examined. First, consistent 
with Cantor and Land’s (1985) argument that conditions of unemployment affect both 
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those who become unemployed and those who experience an economic downturn, the age-
distribution of a geographic area may moderate the impact of economic hardship. Prior 
work has suggested that the impact of economic hardship and crime may be most 
prominently experienced by younger individuals seeking to enter adult labor opportunit ies , 
but fail to do so because of the decline in jobs (Britt, 1997). Given the concentration of co-
offending in adolescence and the declining prevalence of co-offending among individua ls 
over time, it is possible that patterns of co-offending across macro-level areas may be 
similarly tied to the age distribution of an area. Further, Cantor and Land (1985) utilized 
unemployment as one possible measure of economic hardship and hypothesized that 
because that measure was reflective of the general state of the economy, it tapped into the 
experience of adversity relevant for explaining the motivation and opportunity to commit 
crime. As such, the hypothesized processes relating economic hardship to co-offending are 
not specific to unemployment, but rather should emerge across other operationalizations of 
economic hardship. Additionally, prior work suggests that economic hardship may be more 
salient for property crime compared to violent crime because of the potential for monetary 
gain attached to forms of property crime (e.g., Britt, 1997; Cantor & Land, 1985; Phillips 
& Land, 2012; Raphael & Winter, 2001). Therefore, it will be important to consider the 
relationship between co-offending and more than one indicator of economic hardship,  
across crime types, and to investigate whether the impact of economic hardship is 
moderated by the age-profile of an area. 
 This model has not been used to evaluate the relationship between economic 
hardship and co-offending, but serves as a useful guide to elucidate the processes that can 
explain the emergence of co-offending. There are several additional challenges associated 
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with integrating literatures on crime, co-offending, and economic hardship. Tremblay 
(1993) suggests that because there is variability in how both motivation and opportunity 
are related to co-offending, there is a need to consider how these mechanisms are related 
to both rates of co-offending and the proportion of crimes that are co-offenses.  The 
motivation to engage in crime derived from increases in economic hardship should increase 
both the rate and proportion of co-offending. Co-offending is a form of criminal activity 
that is also driven by the experience of adversity and economic hardship. Past research has 
demonstrated a positive association between experiencing adversity and a willingness to 
take on criminal accomplices, therefore the relationship between motivation and the rate 
of co-offending is expected to be positive (McCarthy et al., 1998; Tremblay, 1993). As 
more potential offenders have an expanded willingness to view co-offending as a viable 
action alternative and are situated within contexts conducive to form such relationships, 
this suggests that economic hardship may have a unique and additive relationship on co-
offending. Increased motivation derived from economic hardship would therefore be 
expected to lead to a higher proportion of crime being classified as a co-offense. 
In contrast, the viability of criminal opportunities for crime are expected to be 
diminished by economic hardship due to shifts in the level of guardianship and availability 
of valued goods. Despite the observed negative relationship between 
opportunity/guardianship and crime generally (e.g., Andresen, 2012; Cantor & Land, 
1985), the practical advantages offered by accomplices and the increased convergence of 
potential co-offenders may produce more opportunities and a greater willingness to engage 
in co-offending to overcome the changing landscape of criminal targets. Thus, even with a 
decline in overall criminal opportunities, the proportion of co-offenses relative to all crime 
9 
 
that is committed is expected to increase in areas with increasing levels of economic 
hardship. Specifying the relationship between the short-term effects associated with 
increases in economic hardship and the rate of co-offending is a bit more complex. The 
expected reduction in the availability of targets and increased presence of more effective 
guardians may uniformly depress the volume of all potential opportunities, regardless of 
whether an offender engages in crime alone or with others. This would suggest that there 
is a negative relationship between the short-term effect of economic hardship and the rate 
of co-offending. Still, the advantages and influence of accomplices that may be particular ly 
salient during times of economic hardship could lead offenders to consider co-offending as 
a viable and preferred criminal action. Under this scenario, the rate of co-offenses may be 
positively related to the short-term impact attributable to economic hardship. These 
conflicting processes suggest that there is likely an inconsistent or null relationship 
between the short-term effects of opportunity on the rate of co-offending.  Ultimately, the 
Cantor and Land (1985) model provides a useful framework to evaluate the nuances in the 
relationship between co-offending and economic hardship.    
To evaluate the extent to which conditions of economic hardship are related to co-
offending, macro level data are needed.  The National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) 
offers the opportunity to consider criminal events that involve more than one offender, yet 
it has rarely been leveraged to further our understanding of co-offending.  Indeed, only four 
studies have focused on the co-offending measures in the NCVS (Clark, 1992; Lynch, 
2002; Oudekerk & Morgan, 2016; Reiss, 1988). Although the NCVS was clearly designed 
to capture information related to victimization experiences, the unique data structure and 
rich detail on these victimization experiences has also been extended to develop a research 
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agenda that incorporates a contextual framework (e.g., Xie, Heimer, & Lauritsen, 2012). 
The Bureau of Justice Statistics and the Census Bureau have created a macro-level NCVS 
data file at the metropolitan statistical area level between the years of 1979-2004 that 
provides the opportunity to associate aggregated victim reports of multiple-offender 
criminal incidents to 40 of the largest MSAs across the United States1. Consistent with 
these broader research efforts, this type of data offers an opportunity to study co-offending 
at the macro-level and forms the basis for the research agenda of this dissertation. 
Ultimately, the purpose of this dissertation is to 1) move beyond individual- leve l 
analyses of co-offending and provide a macro-level evaluation of co-offending that also 
demonstrates the utility of using victimization data, 2) evaluate the extent to which 
economic hardship is related to the emergence of co-offending through a modeling strategy 
that provides estimates of the impact of both the long-and short-term processes of 
motivation and opportunity/guardianships, 3) determine more precisely how economic 
hardship is related to co-offending by evaluating the hypothesized relationships across 
different types of group crime, and 4) evaluate the robustness of these findings through the 
implementation of alternative methodological specifications.  
  
                                                                 
1 As discussed in the Data and Methods section below, due to the lack of MSA -level unemployment 
information between 1979 and 1989, the proposed dissertation will only be able to utilize victimization data 
between 1990 and 2004.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The group nature of crime is one of the most well-documented characteristics of 
criminal behavior. Shaw and McKay (1942) observed that approximately 80% of juveniles 
in the Cook County Juvenile Court were suspected of committing crimes with other 
offenders. Co-offending typically referred to as “the perpetration of an offence by more 
than one person” (Weerman, 2003: 398)2. By this definition, co-offending refers to crimina l 
events where more than one offender is actively engaged in the commission of the crime 
(i.e., it does not consider the role of offenders beyond the immediate criminal event). In 
other words, co-offending is not equivalent to having deviant peers.  To aid in 
understanding the distinction, first consider that an individual may have friends who 
socialize and pressure him towards deviance, but still commits crime alone.  Second, 
deviant peers may be part of the potential pool of criminal accomplices, but co-offenders 
may include people other than friends (e.g., McGloin & Nguyen, 2013; Warr, 2002). For 
instance, potential accomplices may be identified in behavioral settings where offenders 
happen to converge or could be drawn from highly organized criminal groups – both of 
which may not overlap with traditionally defined measures of deviant peers (Felson, 2003; 
McGloin & Nguyen, 2013). 
Scholarly research on co-offending has generally lagged behind the broader 
criminological research agenda, as the majority of the existing inquiries on co-offending 
are largely descriptive in nature and exclusively focus on individual- level patterns of co-
offending (e.g., van Mastrigt & Farrington, 2009; Weerman, 2003). These analyses 
                                                                 
2 Tremblay (1993) has extended the definition of co-offending to include all individuals that help plan or 
identify a particular criminal opportunity but may not partake in the actual offense. Other than studies on 
which he is an author, however, the co-offending literature does not embrace this definition.  Instead, it 
focuses on events when individuals commit crime together.   
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represent early efforts to consider co-offending as an important dimension of crimina l 
behavior.  Reiss’ (1988: 117) work represents the first explicit argument that co-offending 
is worthy of its own research agenda: “understanding co-offending is central to 
understanding the etiology of crime and effects of intervention strategies.” To demonstrate 
this point, Reiss (1988) used incident-level data from the National Crime Survey (NCS, 
now known as the National Crime Victimization Survey) to evaluate how various social 
and demographic characteristics of co-offending relationships explained differences in 
patterns to co-offending across the criminal career. Ultimately, Reiss (1988) illuminated 
many of the basic features of co-offending and paved the way for a growing research area.  
Recent research on co-offending has sought to understand the motivat ions 
associated with engaging in group crime (e.g., McCarthy et al., 1998; Weerman, 2003), the 
roles individuals occupy in co-offending relationships (McGloin & Nguyen, 2012), and the 
effect that experience with co-offending has on promoting criminal outcomes (Conway & 
McCord, 2002; Rowan et al, 2016). Unfortunately, van Mastright and Farrington (2009: 
555) framed this literature by stating, “when taken together, they paint a fragmented and 
confusing picture of co-offending.” This is due in part to the limited supply of data used to 
understand co-offending, which has generated conclusions from small-scale studies that 
focus on juvenile delinquency, that are gender specific, and that reflect a small range of 
offense types (see discussion in van Mastrigt & Farrington, 2009). In order to bring new 
insight into the study of co-offending and to expand existing findings, the proposed 
dissertation will use a large-scale data set, the National Crime Victimization Survey 
(NCVS), to address a notably understudied issue in the study of co-offending. Specifica lly, 
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this dissertation investigates co-offending from a macro-level perspective by evaluating 
the extent to which economic hardship facilitates the emergence of co-offending.   
Why Study Co-offending at the Macro-Level? 
There is a sizeable literature examining how patterns of offending and victimiza t ion 
can be explained by social and structural patterns at the macro-level, dating back to Shaw 
and McKay’s (1942) study of social disorganization (e.g., Bursik, 1988; Cohen & Felson, 
1979; Sampson and Groves, 1989; Wilson, 1987). This literature has further demonstrated 
that crime is not randomly distributed across space or time (e.g., Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003; 
Weisburd, Groff, & Yang, 2012). With some exceptions (e.g., Cloward & Ohlin, 1960), 
most of these macro-level perspectives largely overlook or completely discount the impact 
of socio-structural conditions on the form of offending and whether there are mult ip le 
offenders involved. Interestingly, despite the lack of empirical attention towards co-
offending, these theoretical perspectives often acknowledge the important role that a very 
specific type of group has on facilitating the persistence of deviant behavior across 
neighborhoods. Specifically, recognition that gangs or delinquent subcultures exerted 
significant influence on behavior in interstitial areas or neighborhood s was a primary area 
of interest for many of these scholars.  
Thrasher (1927) argued that gangs were a critical component of the urban 
ecological system that emerged as a result of the instability and lack of control over 
immigrant youth. Short and Strodtbeck (1965) also acknowledged that because of the 
structural differentiation across neighborhoods, involvement in peer-groups such as gangs 
became an extremely important source of status, respect, and a means of overcoming 
failures attached to the goals of larger society. The social interactions within and with other 
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gangs served as one of the major contributors to explaining violence among the boys 
studied (Short & Strodtbeck, 1965).  Consistent with this argument, Shaw and McKay 
(1942) described how the concentration of delinquency and its persistence over time were 
a function of the continued contact that individuals have with other offenders (i.e., gangs). 
Specifically, Shaw and McKay (1942) argued that, because of the increased concentration 
of delinquency in certain areas, there was a higher probability of contact with other 
delinquent boys – and older offenders – that perpetuated the reinforcement of crimina l 
activity and sanctioning of non-conformity to deviant norms. Cloward and Ohlin (1960) 
similarly detailed the importance of delinquent subcultures by arguing that crimina l 
behavior that was supported by these delinquent subcultures was likely to recur, access to 
a successful criminal career was often dependent on participant in the delinquent 
subculture, and the delinquent subculture generated a sense of stability and resistance to 
legitimate society by requiring delinquent involvement to maintain one’s social standing. 
Of note, Cloward and Ohlin (1960) distinguished between solitary offenders and offenders 
who were part of a delinquent subculture. This distinction delineated the offending patterns 
of those delinquents who offended alone and those who offended with others – or were at 
least part of a delinquent subculture – and suggested that macro-conditions that produced 
these subcultures imparted substantially higher social and moral costs onto society because 
of the more serious offending of those who participated in delinquent subcultures. 
 In many ways, co-offending serves as one of the linchpins to the observations and 
theoretical strides made by these early macro-level perspectives. Although invoking gangs 
or deviant subcultures was the primary focus, each of these perspectives explicit ly 
reinforced the idea that engaging in crime with others facilitated group-formation and was 
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a consequence of variation in social conditions and opportunity structures across 
geographic areas. If, as Short and Strotdbeck (1965) argued, the criminal group represented 
the intersection of both individual and macro-level factors, scholars must attend to 
understanding both sets of factors to more completely understand co-offending. As 
mentioned, a much larger literature has investigated the individual- level factors associated 
with participation in co-offending, yet a void remains with regard to the macro-level factors 
that facilitate co-offending. Further, by extending our understanding of groups beyond that 
of gangs, we can understand how processes at the macro-level are related to another kind 
of criminal “group” and how they contextualize the interdependent nature of crimina l 
activity.   
Viewing crime as an interdependent event is not a new proposition, as several 
existing criminological theories explicitly attempt to specify the conditions that facilitate 
the emergence of crime. For instance, nearly all criminological theories assume opportunity 
to be a necessary condition for crime to occur, however, routine activities theory more 
specifically theorizes how such criminal opportunities are generated (Cohen & Felson, 
1979). Routine activities perspectives argue that crime requires a motivated offender 
capable of committing a crime, a suitable target for the offender, and the absence of capable 
guardians (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Importantly though, Cohen and Felson (1979) argued 
that structural changes at the macro-level altered routine activity patterns among 
individuals and in turn affected the convergence of the conditions necessary for crime to 
occur (Cohen & Felson, 1979). These arguments have been theorized at the micro-level in 
the sense that differences in individual lifestyles, which expose individuals to motivated 
offenders, are protected by guardians, and interact with attractive targets influence the 
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extent to which individuals are likely to be victimized (e.g., Hindelang et al., 1978; Miethe 
& Meier, 1994). While these theoretical arguments have advanced our understanding of 
offending and victimization patterns, there is limited consideration for how these patterns 
may also be related to co-offending. Indeed, Cohen and Felson (1979, p.589) explicit ly 
stated that “[they] do not examine why individuals or groups are inclined criminally, but 
rather we take criminal inclination as a given…” Such an approach arguably discounts the 
potential for the presence of an additional offender to directly impact the conditions 
necessary for crime to occur.  
As mentioned, prior research has supported the notion that co-offenders can 
facilitate criminal inclination among others, help identify criminal opportunities, and 
ameliorate the role of potential guardians (e.g., Andresen & Felson, 2010; Weerman, 2003; 
Wright & Decker, 1997).  Warr (2001: 79) further suggested crime “depend[s] not on the 
behavior of any one individual, but on the intersections between the criminal careers of 
numerous offenders. Viewed that way, opportunity is not only temporally and spatially 
structured, but socially structured as well.” This is not to argue that incorporating co-
offending into a routine activities framework resolves limitations of the theory, but rather 
illustrates how criminal activity may be dependent on the presence of multiple offenders. 
In fact, Felson and Cohen (1980, p. 403) acknowledged that the theory might benefit from 
investigating offender dynamics and alluded to the potential role of peers, writing:  
However, the routine activity approach might in the future be applied to the analysis 
of offenders and their inclinations as well. For example, the structure of primary 
group activity may affect the likelihood that cultural transmission or social control 
of criminal inclinations will occur, while the structure of the community may 
influence the extent of peer group activity influencing crime. We also expect that 
circumstances favorable for carrying out violations may contribute to crimina l 




Consistent with prior evidence demonstrating how the presence of peers alters risk 
perceptions and criminal inclinations (e.g., Chein et al., 2011; Gardner & Steinberg, 2005; 
McGloin & Thomas, 2016; O’Brien et al., 2011; Warr 2001), it is likely the case that the 
presence of other offenders may be one of the more important “circumstances favorable 
for carrying out violations.” Accordingly, changes in routine activities or other social 
conditions would be hypothesized to impact both crime generally and patterns of co-
offending. Tremblay (1993: 17) argued that whether an individual co-offends should not 
just be a way to classify offenders, but needs to be viewed as an “intelligible outcome of a 
pattern of individually reasoned choices and constraints that vary across settings, across 
crimes, and over a given offender’s life cycle”. Thus, it would seem important to consider 
whether macro-level socio-structural changes influence the likelihood of crime being 
committed by more than one individual.   
 Tremblay (1993) hypothesized that social conditions facilitated the distribution, 
access to, and the search for suitable co-offenders and suggested that this process can be 
framed by routine activities theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Subsequent scholars interested 
in co-offending have further speculated and in some instances empirically tested how 
macro-level factors were related to co-offending, however have been limited by cross-
sectional analyses, data constraints, and underspecified hypotheses. (D’Alessio & 
Stolzenberg, 2010; Felson, 2003; Schaefer et al., 2014; Tremblay, 1993). Felson (2003) 
argued that prior explanations for the emergence of co-offending simply did not have 
enough empirical regularity to explain the process of taking on accomplices: gangs were 
too amorphous, social networks were unbounded, and accomplices tended to be unstable 
over time. To reconcile the limitations of prior work, Felson (2003) suggested that we 
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should explore the role of offender convergence settings as stable structures that can be 
used to understand processes associated with co-offending. Perhaps if we are able to 
identify macro-level conditions that facilitate the likelihood of offender convergence 
settings and the desire to take on criminal accomplices, we can gain a better understanding 
of the conditions that generate co-offending. To build upon this prior literature, this 
dissertation evaluates of the role of a well-known macro-level factor – economic hardship 
- and the emergence of co-offending. 
The Role of Economic Hardship in Explaining Co-offending 
 
Scholars across several disciplines have sought to empirically test the relationship  
between economic hardship and crime (e.g., Becker, 1968; Bonger, 1916; Cantor & Land 
1985; Hale & Sabbagh, 1991; Parker & Horwitz, 1986). The mechanisms that explain this 
relationship largely fall under either motivational or an opportunity framework. With 
respect to motivation, difficulty obtaining or maintaining employment challenges the 
ability of individuals to fulfill basic needs, which may lead individuals to be more likely to 
commit crime (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Merton, 1938). Alternatively, rational choice 
scholars suggest that the decision-making calculus of potential offenders is affected by 
unemployment such that unemployed or underemployed individuals view the perceived 
costs of committing crime to be lower relative to the potential gains (e.g., Becker, 1968; 
Block & Heineke, 1975). Thus, for these individuals, the potential monetary gain (or 
utility) derived from committing crime is weighted more heavily than the costs of being 
caught and convicted. In contrast, employed individuals have significantly more to lose 
and face higher opportunity costs associated with deciding whether to engage in crime. 
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In contrast, criminal opportunity theories posit a negative relationship between 
economic hardship and crime (e.g., Cohen, Felson, & Land, 1980; Cohen & Felson, 1979; 
Cook & Zarkin, 1985). This perspective argues that crime requires a motivated offender 
who has the ability to carry out a crime, a person or object that serves as a suitable target 
for the offender, and the absence of capable guardians (Cohen & Felson, 1979). As 
mentioned, criminal acts can be viewed as incidents that are tied to the convergence of the 
routines of offenders, victims, and capable guardians. Fluctuations or changes in economic 
activity disrupt the conditions that facilitate the emergence of crime, resulting in the 
reduction of criminal opportunities (particularly for property crime). For example, 
increases in unemployment leads more individuals to remain at home instead of at work, 
resulting in an increase in the guardianship over their property and general surroundings 
(Cohen & Felson, 1979). Additionally, economic hardship reduces spending power for the 
purchase of valued goods, which affects the availability and attractiveness of potential 
targets of crime. In total, the changing opportunity structure for crimes results in a 
reduction in criminal activity (Cohen & Felson, 1979). 
Empirical work largely suggests that there is a moderate to inconsistent relationship 
between unemployment and crime. Among the earliest reviews of this relationship, 
Freeman (1983) and Chiricos (1987) generally concluded that there was a small positive 
effect of unemployment on crime that often was inconsistent across studies and generally 
fell short of the magnitude of the relationships between other factors and crime. In response 
to these inconsistent findings, Chiricos (1987) stated that the early “consensus of doubt” 
regarding this relationship challenged scholars to further investigate explanations for the 
inconsistent findings and improve upon methodological limitations. Perhaps most 
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importantly, Cantor and Land (1985: 319) explicitly argued that, “a complete structural 
explanation of the effects of unemployment on crime must incorporate both the impact on 
criminal motivation and the situational impact on the likelihood of motivated offenders 
interacting with ineffectively guarded, suitable targets.” Cantor and Land (1985) argued 
that the relationship between these two components and crime rates were in opposite 
directions. For motivation, they expected that unemployment would have a positive lagged 
effect because the experience of economic hardship would be temporarily buffered by 
social safety nets and other resources. Individuals therefore would not be immedia te ly 
motivated to engage in illegal activity, but over time dwindling access to resources and an 
inability to substantially improve economic stability may lead individuals to become 
motivated to commit crime. With regard to guardianship, increases in unemployment 
would more immediately impact the relative frequency and duration that individuals were 
in their homes, as opposed to at work or in other leisure spaces, and would result in an 
increase in the level of guardianship against criminal activity. Thus, the more 
contemporaneous effect of the guardianship component attributed to unemployment should 
be negative.  
Tremblay (1993) adopted a routine activities framework to articulate hypotheses 
about how changes in broader structural factors (e.g., unemployment, housing 
arrangements, incarceration) could alter the prevalence of motivated co-offenders and the 
quality of criminal opportunities. Specifically, increases in the level of unemployment 
would increase the concentration of potential offenders and the amount of leisure time these 
motivated offenders have to search for co-offenders. As Felson (2003: 157) argued, finding 
co-offenders was not just about the availability or proximity to other offenders, but was 
21 
 
influenced by whether individuals were “likely co-offenders, without outside interference, 
and with substantial time available to socialize.” Increases in unemployment may produce 
a larger number of offender convergence settings that facilitate the ‘mutual discovery 
process’ associated with identifying co-offenders. Cohen and Felson’s (1979) routine 
activities theory assumed offender motivation to be a given, but acknowledged the capacity 
of structural factors to facilitate opportunities for interaction among offenders and targets . 
For instance, Cohen and Felson (1979, p.589) wrote: 
….the convergence in time and space of suitable targets and the absences of capable 
guardians may even lead to large increases in crime without necessarily requiring 
any increase in the structural conditions that motivate individuals to engage in 
crime. That is, if the proportion of motivated offenders or even suitable targets were 
to remain stable in a community, changes in routine activities could nonetheless 
alter the likelihood of their convergence in space and time, thereby creating more 
opportunities for crimes to occur.    
 
This statement acknowledges that shifts in structural conditions generate 
convergence settings ripe for crime, but falls short of explicitly stating that such settings 
would facilitate the interaction of offenders. In turn, these theoretical frameworks have 
been viewed through the lens of assuming that ‘motivated offenders’ are isolated from one 
another. The extent to which there are motivated offenders is partly a function of the extent 
to which individuals interact with other potential offenders and may be willing to engage 
in crime because of the presence and involvement of other offenders.  If increases in 
unemployment generate offender convergence settings, it would likely follow that there 
would be more offenders not just motivated to commit crime, but also a greater likelihood 
of considering engaging in crime with others. 
Changes in economic hardship also impacts the “target backcloth” or distribution 
of suitable targets (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1993). Across the board, increases in 
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guardianship may reduce the total number of available opportunities, but also may 
incentivize individuals to be more willing to offend with others in order to overcome the 
reduction in target vulnerability. As one of the burglars interviewed by Wright and Decker 
(1997: 150) stated: 
[I]t’s almost always a little safer to have someone else with you…Because if you 
got someone outside, they can always give a little signal and let you know when 
someone’s coming or whatever. If you’re alone, you can’t hear these things.  
Similarly, Wright and Decker (1997) concluded from interviews that co-offenders served 
to provide assistance if there was unanticipated resistance from guardians and also 
increased the perceived odds that at least one offender could escape if law enforcement 
was encountered. In the face of a potentially different and a more difficult landscape of 
criminal opportunities, support from co-offenders could facilitate an expansion of 
awareness spaces of more suitable criminal opportunities, provide access to crimina l 
networks, and share in the practical demands associated with the commission of crime. 
Such a resource may prove to be a highly valuable particularly individuals are experiencing 
the effects of economic instability.  
In addition to the practical advantages co-offenders may provide in the completion 
of criminal acts, certain social conditions experienced by offenders may facilitate mutual 
collaboration and trust between offenders (McCarthy et al., 1998; Shover, 1991; Tremblay, 
1993). McCarthy et al. (1998) first formalized a theory for understanding why individua ls 
would be motivated to take on criminal accomplices in the face of the uncertainty and risk 
associated with co-offending. McCarthy et al. (1998) argued that individuals in states of 
desperation would be more likely to believe that achieving one’s own interests may only 
be fulfilled by involving other individuals. These scholars found that despite the inherent 
risks associated co-offending among street youth, experiencing adversity (e.g., failure to 
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find safe shelter, nutritional sustenance) led to a greater willingness to co-offend. In an 
extension of this work, Nguyen and McGloin (2013) evaluated the adversity hypothesis 
among two samples of incarcerated offenders using indicators of more objective 
experiences of adversity, including unemployment. Interestingly, Nguyen and McGloin 
(2013) found less consistent evidence for adversity increasing the likelihood of reported 
co-offending, even among those offenders who reported experiencing unemployment. 
While such results are somewhat conflicting in nature, it is important to recognize that both 
reflect individual-level reported experiences of adversity and neglect to consider the 
broader context that may influence the availability of other potential co-offenders and their 
willingness to co-offend. Specifically, although an individual offender may report 
experiencing an economic downturn, unless that individual is embedded within an area that 
also can be characterized as experiencing higher levels of economic hardship there may 
simply be less opportunity to find other potential motivated offenders and less of a 
motivational shift in the likelihood that people would be willing to take on a co-offender 
in the first place (i.e., McCarthy et al., 1998). Thus, to the extent that exposure to conditions 
of adversity is not equally distributed across space and time, access to individuals who 
might also be motivated to engage in cooperative criminal action will be affected.  
For instance, the positive relationship between experiences of adversity and a 
greater willingness to co-offend among McCarthy et al.’s (1998) sample of street youth 
may be influenced by the fact that these youth were from similar neighborhoods and 
experiencing the same macro-level social conditions. Because the experience of adversity 
was arguably relatively uniform among the sample, so too were the processes that 
facilitated motivation and the opportunities to identify co-offenders.  In contrast, the null 
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or inconsistent relationships observed among the samples of incarcerated offenders used 
by Nguyen and McGloin (2013) may be explained because these offenders came from 
different contexts with conditions that did not necessarily facilitate co-offending. If macro-
level factors matter in affecting the distribution of motivated offenders and the availability 
of convergence spaces, a sample of inmates drawn from various communities and areas are 
more likely to be differentially exposed to conditions that may or may not be conducive to 
co-offending. Ultimately, variation in the prevalence of co-offenses may be influenced by 
broader contextual factors that facilitate the convergence of conditions conducive for co-
offending (Alarid et al., 2009; Hochstetler, 2001; McGloin et al., 2008; Warr, 1996, 2001). 
Still, if changes in socio-structural factors reduce the availability of opportunit ies 
to engage in crime, individuals could potentially become less cooperative. Human ecology 
scholars point out that shocks to society and communities may lead individuals to compete 
over available natural resources (e.g., Hawley, 1986; Park, 1936; Wirth, 1945). In Park’s 
(1936) discussion of human ecology, he argued that the existence of a community 
depended on several factors including: 1) a population that was territorially organized, (2) 
was more or less completely rooted in the soil it occupies, (3) its’ individual units lived in 
a relationship of mutual interdependence and that through competition the symbiotic 
character of a community was maintained. Therefore, competition among individuals may 
increase because socio-structural changes affect the availability of natural resources and 
relations among members in a community. When applied to the discussion of crimina l 
opportunities as a resource, changing socio-structural conditions that diminish the 
availability of criminal opportunities could lead to a scenario where competition trumps 
co-operation among potential offenders.  
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Further, under conditions of economic adversity, changes to the availability of 
suitable targets also affects the potential returns to crime that are an important function of 
the decision to engage in crime. Raphael and Winter (2001) argued that a rational offender 
should compare the returns to time use in legal and illegal activities to determine whether 
to partake in criminal activity. Among those individuals affected by unemployment, 
securing the optimal return to criminal activity in lieu of engaging in licit opportunit ies 
may be achieved by engaging in crime alone. One of the main drawbacks to engaging in 
co-offending is the potential splitting of any profits that would minimize the total monetary 
utility associated with any one criminal act. Perhaps, as criminal opportunities considered 
to be low hanging fruit dwindled (i.e., less risky, available, and unguarded targets), crimina l 
cooperation would become viewed as an increasingly viable option (e.g., Raphael & 
Winter, 2001). This delayed willingness to take on criminal accomplices is potentially 
consistent with the long-term buildup of motivation to engage in crime associated with 
increases in economic hardship (Cantor & Land, 1985).  Ultimately however, hypotheses 
suggesting increasing economic hardship leads to criminal competition are not entirely 
consistent with evidence in support individuals recognizing that one’s own prosocial or 
illegal goals/interests can only be achieved through cooperation (e.g., Coleman, 1990; 
McCarthy et al., 1998). Therefore, this dissertation empirically evaluates the extent to 
which economic hardship actually promotes criminal cooperation. 
Two prior studies have considered whether variation in neighborhood and city-leve l 
demographic and social characteristics influence rates of co-offending (D’Alessio & 
Stolzenberg, 2010; Schaefer et al., 2014). In an effort to disentangle the relationship 
between urbanicity and offending, D’Alessio and Stolzenberg (2010) utilized NIBRS 
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incident-level data to tease apart competing mechanisms that could explain this 
relationship. Specifically, areas with reduced collective efficacy, or social breakdown as 
D’Alessio and Stolzenberg (2010: 713) referred to it, may reduce “the development of 
friendship networks necessary to induce the occurrence of co-offending crime.” In contrast, 
subcultural theories suggest that areas of high urbanicity are characterized by more 
extensive deviant subcultures that facilitate group based offending. D’Alessio and 
Stolzenberg (2010) found that consistent with social breakdown theory urbaniza t ion 
reduced co-offending, however, there was also was no relationship between the rate of 
unemployment and co-offending.  
In a theoretical and empirical complement to the aforementioned study, Schaefer et 
al. (2014) argued that neighborhoods low in social disorganization promoted trust (or 
collective efficacy) among residents and facilitated connections to social networks that 
generated a context conducive to co-offending. Using delinquency records from Maricopa 
County, Arizona, Schaefer et al. (2014) reported that although collective efficacy was 
found to reduce crime, areas characterized by low disadvantage, residential stability, and 
demographic homogeneity actually exhibited more co-offending. Schaefer et al. (2014) 
concluded that a byproduct of the higher degree of collective efficacy among social 
networks in these areas was the ability to trust other potential offenders. A case could also  
be made that these same areas may exhibited a high degree of guardianship, consistent with 
Sampson et al.’s (1997) finding that areas high in collective efficacy demonstrated a higher 
degree of residents’ willingness to intervene on behalf of some common good. Although 
increased guardianship generated from unemployment and collective efficacy may be 
driven by two distinct processes, both macro-level conditions similarly affect the quality 
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and viability of criminal opportunities that may lead individuals to be more willing to take 
on criminal accomplices in order to overcome the added risks involved in such an endeavor. 
Thus, it may also be possible that the changing opportunity structure for crime in these 
areas promoted criminal cooperation because of the fact that the inherent risks and 
difficulty associated with crime increased. 
Although Schaefer et al. (2014) and D’Alessio and Stolzenberg (2010) recognized 
the vital role that neighborhood and contextual factors played in generating the conditions 
conducive to co-offending, these studies face several limitations that impede the strength 
of the conclusions. First, these studies are limited by the fact that both use official police 
statistics that may not capture the full range of co-offending events. As mentioned earlier, 
official statistics drastically underreport the number of crimes that are committed – 
including co-offenses - and may not be able to identify whether crimes involved mult ip le 
offenders. Contextual variation in disadvantage has also been linked to victim willingness 
to report crimes to police, therefore, relying on official records to assess how different 
contexts facilitate co-offending ignores the systematic differences in rates of reporting 
(Baumer, 2002; Kirk & Matsuda, 2011).  
These studies also only considered whether co-offending was cross-sectionally 
associated with socio-structural conditions. Co-offending research broadly has only 
evaluated the cross-sectional relationship between states of adversity and the likelihood (or 
willingness) of co-offending, yet research at the macro level suggests that changes in social 
conditions likely have both immediate effects on criminal opportunities and longer lasting 
shifts in motivation to engage in crime (e.g., Cohen & Land, 1985; Kubrin & Weitzer, 
2003). In order to detect both types of processes, longitudinal data are required (e.g., Cohen 
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& Felson, 1979; Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003). Lastly, there has not yet been a complete 
consideration of the distinction between the rate of co-offending and proportion of crimes 
that are co-offenses. Understanding how macro-level conditions are related to these two 
substantively different outcomes may provide insight into the nuances in how offenders 
respond to social-structural conditions.  Ultimately, this prior work has not yet specifica lly 
theorized and rigorously considered how increases in economic hardship has implicat ions 
for understanding the emergence of co-offending.  
Specifying the Relationship between Co-offending and Economic Hardship 
In Tremblay’s (1993) discussion of the relationship between economic hardship 
and co-offending, he referenced prior work by Cantor and Land (1985) that developed a 
well-known model for estimating the relationship between economic hardship and crime. 
Cantor and Land (1985) argued that there were essentially two mechanisms through which 
economic hardship, as measured by unemployment, impacted crime: 1) a system activity 
or “motivation” effect, and 2) a guardianship effect. The system activity effect represents 
the motivation to engage in crime, whereas the guardianship effect reflects the level of 
protection provided to potential criminal targets or opportunities. Cantor and Land (1985: 
319) explicitly argued that, “a complete structural explanation of the effects of 
unemployment on crime must incorporate both the impact on criminal motivation and the 
situational impact on the likelihood of motivated offenders interacting with ineffective ly 
guarded, suitable targets.” They suggested that the relationship between these two 
components and crime rates would be in opposite directions. For the system activity effect, 
they expected that unemployment would exhibit a positive lagged effect because economic 
hardship would be temporally buffered by social safety nets and other resources. 
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Individuals therefore would not be immediately motivated to engage in illegal activity, but 
over time dwindling access to resources and an inability to substantially improve economic 
stability may lead individuals to be motivated to turn to crime. With regard to the 
guardianship effect, shifts in employment should impact the relative frequency and 
duration that individuals are in their homes, as opposed to at work, or other in leisure spaces 
and therefore would result in an increase in the level of guardianship against crimina l 
activity. Thus, the contemporaneous effect of the guardianship component in the model 
should be negative.  
Consistent with the expectations of the model, Cantor and Land (1985) found that 
the motivational component was positive, particularly for property crime, and the 
guardianship effect was negative. More recent work on the relationship between economic 
hardship and crime has offered mixed results, however (e.g., Andresen, 2012, 2016; 
Arvanities & DeFina, 2006; Greenberg, 2001).  Even so, the Cantor and Land (1985) model 
provides a useful framework to evaluate the nuances in the relationship between co-
offending and economic hardship. Still, there are several challenges to integrat ing 
literatures on crime, co-offending, and economic hardship. Perhaps most notably, whereas 
the outcome is straightforward for studies focused on crime rates, the theoretical arguments 
regarding the potential relationship between unemployment and co-offending highlight the 
potential relevance of two related, yet distinct, outcomes.  Specifically, Tremblay’s (1993) 
theoretical view suggested that, because there was variability in how motivation and 
opportunity were related to co-offending, there was a need to consider both rates of co-
offending and the proportion of crimes that are co-offenses as dependent variables. 
Thinking about both outcomes provides more nuanced insight on how macro-level contexts 
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might facilitate conditions that make co-offending more likely to occur (i.e., rates) and also 
a viable action alternative for offenders (i.e., proportion) (Weerman, 2003).   
 Drawing on Tremblay’s (1993) work and extensions of it, there is reason to believe 
that economic hardship will lead to an increase in the occurrence or volume of co-offending 
as a result of the increased concentration of motivated (co)offenders who are more willing 
to take on accomplices to meet their goals. As many theoretical perspectives suggest 
(Becker, 1968; Bonger, 1916; Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Cohen, 1955; Hughes & Carter, 
1981), difficult economic circumstances should increase individuals’ motivation for crime.  
Above and beyond that general increase in criminal motivation, however, there may be a 
greater willingness to engage in group crime, despite the added risks it entails (e.g., 
incompetent co-offenders, snitching).  Indeed, past findings indicate that that individua ls 
exposed to adverse economic conditions were more likely to express a willingness to 
cooperate with others and take on the risks that accompany co-offending because the 
potential gains were so attractive during a state of adversity (McCarthy et al., 1998; 
Tremblay, 1993).  
With regard to the other mechanism, the reduction of suitable crimina l 
opportunities during higher levels of unemployment may prompt offenders to adapt their 
behavior by shifting away from solo crime towards co-offending. In the face of an 
economic slowdown, opportunities for crime are reduced because targets may become less 
suitable and guardianship increases, which should depress the overall crime rate (e.g., 
Cantor & Land, 1985; Cohen & Felson, 1979). Under such circumstances, taking on 
accomplices may provide a number of practical advantages (e.g., Weerman, 2003; Wright 
& Decker, 1994). Not only might co-offenders offer aid during the actual criminal event 
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(e.g., serve as a lookout), but they may provide access to information that could open up 
more viable criminal opportunities (e.g., broaden awareness spaces and criminal skills). 
Moreover, Tremblay (1993) argued that one consequence of increases in unemployment 
was an increased concentration of potential (co)offenders in primary group leisure spaces 
(see also Felson, 2003).  Scholars have noted that one of the most important precursors of 
co-offending is the availability of accomplices (Weerman, 2003).  Thus, offenders may not 
only see the advantages of turning to group crime but also may simply have greater access 
to a pool of potential co-offenders who may provide such advantages.  Thus, even as the  
short-term “guardianship” component of economic hardship effect reduces crime rates, the 
total proportion of crimes that are co-offenses may increase. Thinking more carefully about 
the relationship between co-offending and the processes associated with unemployment 
requires a thorough consideration of the expected impact that motivation and opportunity 
will have on both outcomes of group crime.  
Motivation and Co-offending 
  
Motivation derived from economic hardship is expected to increase an individua l’s 
willingness to not only offend, but also partake in crime with other offenders. Cantor and 
Land (1985: 319) described how “an increase in the unemployment rate produces a shift in 
the density distribution of the population along [a motivation continuum] towards its higher 
end.” Further, they argued that the shift in the density distribution was not entirely due to 
changes in motivation to commit crime among those who become unemployed, but rather 
was also influenced by individuals who were still employed but were negatively affected 
by the economic climate. One could argue that parallel to the distribution of motivation to 
offend is a similar continuum indicative of a willingness to engage in co-offending. Indeed, 
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McCarthy et al. (1998) found evidence for the fact that under conditions of adversity 
individuals were more willing to take on criminal accomplices. Despite the inherent 
uncertainties associated with co-offending, conditions of economic hardship may generate 
a context in which there is an expanded motivation to co-offend.  
Thus, it may be the case that not only does the pool of motivated offenders grows 
larger, but the degree to which these offenders are willing to co-offend expands as well. 
Similar to the fact that economic hardship impacts both those who are unemployed and 
underemployed, the motivation to engage in co-offending also applies to range of potential 
offenders. Offenders could be crudely categorized into individuals who previously have 
committed crime or actively consider crime as part of their behavioral repertoire and those 
individuals who have limited to no experience with criminal behavior. Among both types 
of offenders, co-offending may become viewed as a viable action alternative as a result of 
experiencing economic hardship (e.g., McCarthy et al., 1998; Nguyen & McGloin, 2013; 
Weerman, 2003). Experienced offenders recognize the risks involved with shift ing 
criminal opportunities and taking on criminal accomplices, however, may reconcile these 
challenges with the potential benefits derived from co-offending (e.g., McCarthy et al., 
1998). Alternatively, uninitiated individuals that previously did not view crime as an 
option, may take comfort in committing crime in the company of others because of the 
anonymity, diffusion of responsibility, and mitigation of risk involved with co-offending 
(e.g., McGloin & Piquero 2009, Warr, 2002). Thus, even though participation in delinquent 
and risky behavior may be inconsistent with an individual’s long-term preferences or 
beliefs, the presence of others may offer the necessary incentives and confidence to engage 
in risky behavior (Granovetter, 1978; Matza, 1964; McGloin & Rowan, 2015; Thomas & 
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McGloin, 2016). As a result of the fact that the experience of economic hardship would be 
anticipated to facilitate greater motivation to engage in co-offending among both of these 
types of potential offenders, there would be an expected increase in the rate of co-
offending. Therefore, the dissertation hypothesizes: 
Hypothesis 1: There will be a positive relationship between economic hardship and 
the rate of co-offending in the long-term. 
 The increased viability of engaging in crime with others among a wide range of 
potential offenders suggests that the overall distribution of crime that is committed by more 
than one offender would shift. Tremblay (1993) introduced the notion that increases in 
unemployment would be related to the proportion of crimes that involved co-offending, 
unfortunately, he did not fully specify his predictions. While he provided a rationale for 
the relationship between motivation and the rate of co-offending and 
opportunity/guardianship and the ratio of co-offenses to total offenses, he left unanswered 
how motivation was related to the ratio of co-offenses to total offenses and how 
opportunity/guardianship was related to the rate of co-offending. As previously mentioned, 
shifts in unemployment contribute to conditions that facilitate individuals being more 
willing to cooperate with others (e.g., McCarthy et al., 1998). Consistent with the fact that 
changes in motivation to engage in co-offending are a function of both individua ls 
previously inclined to engage in crime and individuals uninitiated into the criminal world 
that now view co-offending as a viable choice, it would also be expected that the total 
proportion of crimes that are co-offenses logically increases. As more potential offenders 
have an expanded willingness to view co-offending as a viable action alternative and are 
situated in contexts conducive to forming such relationships, this suggests that economic 
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hardship may have a unique and additive relationship on the likelihood that an offense 
involves more than one offender. Stated differently, if the rate at which individuals are 
opting to engage in crime with other offenders surpasses that of engaging in crime alone, 
the distribution of crime committed in an area would shift towards co-offending. Increased 
motivation derived from economic hardship would therefore be expected to lead to a higher 
proportion of crimes being classified as a co-offense. Thus, it is hypothesized that:  
Hypothesis 2: The will be a positive relationship between economic hardship and 
the proportion of crimes that are co-offenses in the long-term. 
 
Opportunity and Co-offending 
As previously mentioned, increases in economic hardship are expected to lead to a 
lower convergence of the conditions that produce criminal acts, resulting in an overall 
reduction in crime (e.g., Cohen & Felson, 1979; Cantor & Land, 1985). Previously 
employed individuals are more likely to spend time in primary locations (i.e., homes, 
neighborhoods), leading to an increased concentration of guardians. Additionally, because 
of the depressed economic conditions, individuals have less purchasing power for valuable 
goods and also spend less time in job-related and other leisure travel. Consistent with the 
fact that a significant amount of personal property crime occurs when individuals are 
outside of their homes, these changes in the vulnerability and distribution of available 
targets results in potentially more difficult and risky criminal opportunities (e.g., Cohen & 
Felson, 1979). Nonetheless, co-offenders may be particularly apt to take on less suitable 
targets, as they not only provide a number of practical advantages but also shift preferences 
towards more risky endeavors (e.g., Gardner & Steinberg, 2005; Weerman, 2003). 
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 As Wright and Decker (1997) found in their interviews with burglars, co-offenders 
provided a number of tactical advantages in managing victims, facilitated the transfer of 
goods, and shared the demands of completing a crime. Further, it may be expected that 
offenders need to capitalize on co-offenders’ awareness space, criminal skillset, or crimina l 
network to identify available opportunities or overcome the challenges presented by 
increased guardianship. Collectively, this suggests that offenders may engage in adaptive 
behavior as a result of changes in the distribution and quality of criminal opportunit ies. 
Additionally, because potential co-offenders are more likely to be concentrated and 
accessible during times of increased economic hardship, this facilitates an increase in the 
number of convergent settings for offenders to find suitable co-offenders (e.g., Cantor & 
Land, 1985; Felson, 2003). Thus, despite the decline in crime associated with increases in 
unemployment found in prior research, the total proportion of crimes that are co-offenses 
would be expected to increase because of the advantages and accessibility of co-offenders. 
Therefore, this dissertation hypothesizes: 
Hypothesis 3:  There will be a positive relationship between economic hardship 
and the proportion of crimes that are co-offenses in the short-term. 
 
To judiciously consider the full implications of how opportunity/guardianship is 
related to co-offending, it is necessary to consider how it might also be related to the rate 
of co-offending. The reduction in the availability of targets and increased presence of more 
effective guardians may have a relatively uniform suppression on the volume of all crimina l 
opportunities. Given that prior work generally finds a negative relationship between the 
contemporaneous effects of opportunity/guardianship on crime, this could be considered 
evidence indicative of the overall reduction in criminal opportunities – regardless of 
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whether an offender engages in the act alone or with others (e.g., Cantor & Land, 1985; 
Phillips & Land, 2012). Nonetheless, several studies have found that the negative short-
term effect of opportunity on crime varies depending on the type of crime considered (e.g., 
Andresen, 2015; Aravanites & DeFina, 2006; Rosenfeld & Fornango, 2007). For instance, 
Andresen (2015) found that the short-run effects of unemployment were positively related 
to shoplifting and theft. He interpreted this finding as offenders shifting towards 
committing less serious property crime. Although speculative, an association between co-
offending and property crime may help explain the presence of a positive short-run 
relationship to these crime types. If offenders engage in adaptive behavior, such that they 
are more likely to engage in group crime to overcome the difficulty attached to more 
guarded and difficult criminal opportunities, Andresen’s (2015) finding may be suggestive 
of an increased volume of offenders involved that have opted to co-offend.  
The extent to which a reduction in suitable criminal opportunities differentia l ly 
deters offenders may explain the rate of both co-offending and solo crimes. Consistent with 
the previous discussion of opportunity, co-offenders may be particularly suited to meet the 
demands of more difficult and less suitable criminal opportunities.  Because of the 
instrumental advantages offered by co-offenders and the mechanisms that produce a sense 
of anonymity and shared responsibility, co-offending may be viewed as both a viable and 
preferred option during conditions of economic hardship. As Clarke argued (2009), 
according to a rational choice perspective potential offenders will attempt to continue to 
offend even when faced with blocked or more difficult opportunities. Weisburd et al. 
(2006) found some qualitative evidence suggesting that prostitutes and individuals selling 
drugs engaged in method displacement, which involved engaging in strategies to avoid 
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being detected or arrested. To be sure, this does not speak to a shift in the form of offending, 
but does provide evidence that offenders may engage in adaptive behavior that reduces 
risks associated with changes in opportunities. The decision to take on accomplices, may 
similarly be viewed as a way to mitigate the risks involved with less tenable opportunit ies. 
Still, the overwhelming evidence suggests that the deterrence processes associated with 
police interventions overwhelming discourages most forms of displacement (e.g., 
Weisburd et al., 2006). The competing forces surrounding the availability and adaptations 
to criminal opportunities suggest that there is likely an inconsistent or null relationship 
between the short-term effects of opportunity on the rate of co-offending. As such, this 
dissertation proposes the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: There will be a null relationship between economic hardship and the 
rate of co-offending in the short-term. 
Economic Hardship and Co-offending by Crime Type 
The impact of economic hardship on crime and co-offending is arguably not 
monolithic. Within the co-offending literature there tends to be an empirical interest or 
discussion of the role of co-offenders across different types of crime (e.g., Cromwell et al., 
1991; McGloin & Rowan, 2015). Co-offending is often discussed as a highly instrumenta l 
process (i.e., crime was planned ahead, or the co-offender was selected based on some 
attribute) where there is an explicit ‘exchange’ of skills or knowledge about a particular 
criminal opportunity (e.g., Andresen & Felson, 2010; Weerman, 2003). Still, co-offending 
also involves criminal incidents characterized by more primordial or spontaneous 
convergence of multiple offenders that does not involve pre-planned deliberation to solicit 
the assistance of other offenders (e.g., Felson, 2009; McGloin & Rowan, 2015). The 
theoretical arguments laid forth in this dissertation to support the relationship between 
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economic hardship and the emergence of co-offending are applicable to both types of 
criminal incidents. The increased concentration of potentially motivated offenders in space 
in time due to increases in economic hardship, may lead to simply more convergence 
settings that facilitate minimally planned criminal activity that could be substantive ly 
different from highly organized criminal activity. Alternatively, if the quality and quantity 
of criminal opportunities decline with increases in economic hardship, leveraging crimina l 
connections to identify and seek out more lucrative targets could become a more probable 
feature of instrumental criminal decision-making. Although it would be theoretica lly 
informative to understand whether changes in macro-level conditions induce changes in 
the type of co-offending, without data to measure differences in the specific motivat ions 
behind incidents of co-offending it is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Nonetheless, evaluating these relationships across different crime types can provide 
some insight and serve as a proxy solution to understanding how economic hardship may 
be related to instrumental and primordial criminal acts (e.g., Britt, 1997; Cantor & Land, 
1985; Phillips & Land, 2012; Raphael & Winter, 2001). Property crimes, such as robbery, 
theft, and burglary, are qualitatively different from more violent or expressive crimes 
because they may be viewed as a means to compensate for economic needs that are 
impacted by increasing levels of economic hardship. With respect to co-offending, much 
of the discussion about the exchange processes associated with taking on crimina l 
accomplices and the role that co-offenders have on altering offender awareness spaces 
tends to also more closely align with instrumental crimes (e.g., Hochstelter, 2001; 
Weerman, 2003). If co-offenders facilitate an increase in awareness spaces for crimina l 
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opportunities, it is likely because they are helping offenders identify viable or lucrative 
criminal targets that have some extrinsic benefit attached to it.  
Prior work has also suggested that the presence of others can facilitate more 
expressive or violent types of criminal activity because they obviate concern for the risks 
attached to engaging in more serious types of crime (e.g., McGloin & Rowan, 2015; 
McGloin & Thomas, 2016). Due to the seriousness of engaging in violent crime, it may be 
that the having other offenders present reduces a sense of responsibility and anonymity that 
help persuade individuals who may not otherwise engage in violent behavior choose to 
engage in such crime (e.g., LeBon, 1960; McGloin & Piquero, 2009). If there is an increase 
in the convergence of potential offenders in space and time due to increases in economic 
hardship, violent collective behavior may also be expected to increase. In thinking about 
how the relationship between economic hardship and co-offending varies by crime type, 
this raises a few additional issues over the direction of the relationship between measures 
of economic hardship and the rate and the proportion outcomes for each type of co-
offending.  
Prior research indicates that impact of economic hardship may be more salient for 
instrumental crimes that result in monetary gains (e.g., Britt, 1997; Cantor & Land, 1985; 
Phillips & Land, 2012; Raphael & Winter, 2001). Part of this explanation is driven by the 
fact that individuals may become more motivated to engage in such crimes because of the 
potential reward attached to successful instrumental crimes. As a result, it would be 
expected that increases in motivation driven by economic hardship in the long- term 
(Hypothesis 1) would lead offenders to become more motivated to engage in instrumenta l 
co-offenses, as opposed to other violent or expressive forms of co-offenses. Consistent with 
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this argument, it would be expected that because of the motivating pull of instrumenta l 
forms of crimes coupled with the increased willingness of individuals to take on co-
offenders, there would be an increase in the proportion of instrumental crimes that are 
classified as co-offenses (Hypothesis 2). There is little reason to expect that increases in 
economic hardship will lead individuals to become more motivated to engage in expressive 
or violent co-offenses (e.g., simple or aggravated assault). Thus, the long-term effect of 
increased motivation would not be expected to be related to the overall rate of expressive 
co-offending or proportion of expressive crimes that are co-offenses. This leads to several 
additional sub-hypotheses by crime type: 
Hypothesis 1a: There will be a positive relationship between economic hardship 
and the rate of instrumental co-offending in the long-term. 
Hypothesis 1b: There will be a null relationship economic hardship and the rate of 
expressive co-offending in the long-term. 
Hypothesis 2a: There will be a positive relationship between economic hardship 
and the proportion of instrumental crimes that are co-offenses in the long-term. 
Hypothesis 2b: There will be a null relationship between economic hardship and 
the proportion of expressive crimes that are co-offenses in the long-term. 
  
With respect to the relationship between opportunity/guardianship and the rate and 
proportion of crimes that are co-offenses (Hypothesis 3 & Hypothesis 4), it would be 
expected that there would be some similar implications for both instrumental and 
expressive forms of co-offending. As argued by Cantor and Land (1985), increased levels 
of economic hardship alter the opportunity structures for crime by increasing the presence 
of unemployed guardians in homes and diminishing the quality and quantity of targets 
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because individuals have reduced spending power. This shift in guardianship and the 
overall distribution of available (and valuable) targets, may lead individuals to consider 
taking on criminal accomplices for instrumental crimes to overcome the added risks 
associated with targeting more guarded or lucrative criminal opportunities (e.g., Wright 
and Decker, 1997). Still, the overall suppression of criminal opportunities as a result of 
changes in the opportunity structure of crime may universally impact both crimes that 
would be committed alone and with other offenders. As a result, the competing forces on 
criminal opportunities suggest that there is likely an inconsistent or null relationship 
between the short-term effects of opportunity on the rate of instrumental co-offending 
(Hypothesis 3). 
 In contrast, although it is likely the case that the overall rate of instrumental co-
offending is negatively related to the short-term opportunity/guardianship effect, it is 
hypothesized that the proportion of instrumental crimes are co-offenses is expected to 
increase. Potential co-offenders are more likely to be concentrated and accessible during 
times of increased economic hardship, which increases the availability of behavioral 
convergent settings for individuals to identify and find suitable co-offenders (e.g., Felson, 
2003; Tremblay, 1993). In addition to the increase in these types of settings, the adaptive 
utility of taking on criminal accomplices may be paramount during times of economic 
hardship. As mentioned, co-offenders may facilitate an expansion of offenders’ awareness 
spaces, provide criminal skills, or have knowledge of identifying criminal opportunities or 
targets (Hochstetler, 2001; Weerman, 2003). This could contribute to viewing co-offending 
for instrumental crimes as both a viable and preferred option when economic hardship 
increases. Because this suggests that offenders would engage in adaptive behavior away 
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from solo-offending and towards co-offending for instrumental crimes, there would be an 
expected positive relationship between the short-term effects of economic hardship and the 
proportion of instrumental crimes that are co-offenses.  
If increases in economic hardship generate more accessible and stable behavioral 
convergence settings, it would also be anticipated that the rate and the proportion of 
expressive crimes that are co-offenses would increase. Cantor and Land (1985) posited that 
increases in economic hardship would lead to an increase in the concentration of leisure 
activities within primary group locations (i.e., homes, neighborhoods, community). They 
further claimed that this would lead to lower rates of violent crime because most violent 
acts were committed by casual acquaintances or strangers, which would be less prevalent 
within primary-group locations. While empirical evidence has provided evidence in 
support of this claim, it overlooked the fact that an increased convergence of offenders in 
primary-group locations also facilitates access to and interaction with other potential co-
offenders (Cantor & Land, 1985; Tremblay, 1993). 
This has important implications for expressive criminal behavior, because of the 
potentially salient role that the presence of others plays in facilitating violent behavior. 
McGloin and Piquero (2009: 339) argued that processes tied to group involvement, 
including anonymity and the diffusion of responsibility, facilitate individuals to “move past 
some restraint threshold for offending.” If expressive or violent behavior requires more 
situational inducement to partake in, the increased concentration and availabil ity of 
potential offenders due to economic hardship may facilitate a particularly important 
situational inducement – a co-offender (McGloin & Rowan, 2015).  Indeed, McGloin and 
Piquero (2009) observed that violent criminal behavior was characterized as having more 
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offenders involved – independent of these accomplices prior involvement in violence - 
when compared to nonviolent crimes. This provides some support for how the presence of 
other offenders can contribute towards a greater likelihood of violent behavior. Thus, the 
saliency of group processes in altering perceptions of risks/costs associated with expressive 
crime and the hypothesized increase in convergence settings would translate to an expected 
positive relationship between the opportunity/guardianship effect and the rate of expressive 
co-offending. McCord and Conway (2002) also observed a relationship between group 
offending and violent behavior, finding that individuals were more likely to engage in 
violent behavior after being exposed to a co-offender who had previously engaged in 
violent crime. This suggests that economic hardship may also produce behavioral 
convergent settings that facilitate socialization and contact among offenders with varied 
histories of violent and expressive behavior. Collectively, there would be an expected 
positive relationship between the short-term effects of opportunity/guardianship and the 
proportion of expressive crimes that are co-offenses. This results in the following sub-
hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 3a: There will be a positive relationship between economic hardship 
and the proportion of instrumental crimes that are co-offenses in the short-term. 
Hypothesis 3b: There will be a positive relationship between economic hardship 
and the proportion of expressive crimes that are co-offenses in the short-term. 
Hypothesis 4a: There will be a null relationship between economic hardship and 
the rate of instrumental co-offending in the short-term. 
Hypothesis 4b: There will be a positive relationship between economic hardship 
and the rate of expressive co-offending in the short-term. 
44 
 
Variation in the Impact of Economic Hardship on Co-offending across MSA 
Age-Profiles 
In addition to the potential for these relationships to vary across crime type, Cantor 
and Land (1985) argued that the impact of economic hardship, as measured through the 
unemployment rate, impacted those individuals who were unemployed, underemployed, 
and others experiencing economic instability. This point was part of a well-known debate 
between Cantor and Land (2001) and Greenberg (2001), to which Cantor and Land (2001: 
331) clarified their original argument by stating, “…we postulated both a direct effect of 
an increase in the aggregate unemployment rate on the criminal motivation of the specific 
individuals who become unemployed and a contextual effect on the criminal motivation of 
others in the population.” This point has two major implications for understanding the 
relationship between co-offending and economic hardship. First, consistent with Cantor 
and Land’s (1985) argument that conditions of unemployment (economic hardship) 
affected both those who become unemployed and those who experienced an economic 
downturn, the age-distribution of a geographic area may moderate the impact of economic 
hardship. Prior work has suggested that the impact of economic hardship and crime was  
most prominently experienced by younger individuals seeking to enter adult labor 
opportunities, but failed to do so because of the decline in available jobs (Britt, 1997). 
Given the concentration of co-offending in adolescence and the declining prevalence of 
co-offending among individuals over time, it is possible that patterns of co-offending 
across macro-level areas may be similarly tied to the age distribution of an area 
It also may be the case that among older individuals who are actively part of the 
labor market, changes in economic conditions may directly impact their willingness to 
engage in group crime and the opportunity structure for crime. Britt (1997) also found that 
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unemployment had a greater motivational effect among adults for homicide and aggravated 
assault. Crutchfield (1989) study on labor stratification and violent crime provided some 
context to this finding by claiming that neighborhoods with higher levels of unemployment 
or underemployment in secondary labor markets generated a “situation of company” 
context. Specifically, there is an influx of individuals who are idle and not participating in 
school, work, or the local labor market. This increases the number of potential victims, 
offenders, and arguably co-offenders in a given area. As such, if changes in the state of the 
economy are most salient for the adult segment of the population most attached to the labor 
market, the impact of economic hardship on co-offending may be moderated by the 
prevalence of this adult population.  In order to take a first step towards understanding how 
the age-distribution of an MSA moderates the impact of economic hardship on outcomes 
associated with co-offending, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 5: Of the relationships between economic hardship and co-offending 
outcomes where a positive relationship is predicted, it is expected that this 
relationship will be positively moderated by the distribution of the age-profile of an 
MSA. 
 
The NCVS offers the unique opportunity to utilize a longitudinal dataset in order 
to assess how macro-level conditions influence the emergence of co-offending. The Bureau 
of Justice Statistics and the Census Bureau have created an aggregate level NCVS data file 
at the MSA-level between the years of 1990-2004 that would provide the opportunity to 
associate aggregated victim reports of multiple-offender criminal incidents to a number of 
large MSAs across the United States. Leveraging this unique dataset will also provide 
46 
 
substantial advancements into scholarly research interested in co-offending. Scholars have 
argued for some time that the convergence of offenders and offenders’ willingness to 
cooperate are influenced by socio-structural conditions, yet without data that enables this 
type of analysis these hypotheses remain untested (Felson, 2003; Tremblay, 1993). Further, 
given the differences in the expected effects of motivation and opportunity on co-offending 
and across crime type, this research will illuminate how changes in macro-level economic 
hardship influences the emergence of behavioral convergence settings that are conducive 
to co-offending. Not only does this provide a contextualized understanding of collective 
criminal behavior, but subsequently underscores the fact that purely instrumental or 
rational models of criminal behavior often overlook how the self-interest of offenders may 
be achieved by collaborative efforts with other offenders when faced with categorical 
changes in opportunity structures and sources of motivation (McCarthy et al., 1998; 
Schaefer et al., 2014).  Ultimately, this research question provides an empirical template 
for further inquiry into understanding the socio-structural conditions that differentiate 




CHAPTER 3: DATA & METHODS 
 
 This dissertation uses data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), 
which is the largest nationally representative source of information on crimina l 
victimization in the United States. The NCVS is administered to a nationally representative 
sample of households by the United States Census Bureau and is sponsored by the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics (BJS). In total, the NCVS is a collection of individual interviews 
conducted with the residents of households sampled and include approximately 90,000 
housing units and 160,000 individuals that are interviewed twice each year for three years. 
The NCVS has been collecting information on personal and household victimization since 
1972, however, the survey underwent a significant redesign in 1992. The survey was 
developed by BJS with four goals in mind: “(1) to develop detailed information about the 
victims and consequences of crime; (2) to estimate the numbers and types of crimes not 
reported to the police; (3) to provide uniform measures of selected types of crimes, and; 
(4) to permit comparisons over time and types of areas” (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
2014:1). The NCVS collects information through self-reports of individuals age 12 or older 
on nonfatal personal crimes (rape or sexual assault, robbery, aggravated and simple assault, 
personal larceny) and household property crime (burglary, motor vehicle theft, and other 
theft).  
The NCVS has a series of strengths that address the existing limitations in co-
offending research that relies on individual- level, offender based analyses or offic ia l 
records. First, the NCVS (formerly NCS) has used a nationally representative sampling 
frame to gather information on victimization experiences. At a minimum, these data will 
provide macro-level estimates for co-offending among offenses where individuals were 
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able to report whether or not more than one offender was involved in the victimizat ion. 
Prior work has largely relied on samples of incarcerated offenders, street youth, or in some 
instances official records among juveniles or specific types of offenders (i.e., burglars, 
males). This approach limits the generalizability of the findings to the select sample used 
and often is based on cross-sectional analyses that inhibit an assessment of temporal 
ordering of many of the proposed hypotheses. The NCVS does not restrict which offenders 
are included in reports of victimization, except insofar as victimizations of those potential 
respondents under the age of 12 or those who decline to participate in the survey are 
excluded. Importantly, person-level response rates have been extremely high, ranging from 
96% in 1973 to 87% in 2014 (Truman & Langton, 2015).  
Second, the NCVS has been used to capture the dark figure of crime or crime that 
is not reported to the police and used in official statistics. It has been well established that 
a non-random portion of crimes are unreported to police. Most recently in 2014, 46% of 
violent victimizations and 37% of property victimizations were reported to the police, 
leaving a relatively large percentage of crimes that may involve co-offenders missing from 
official records (Truman & Langton, 2015). It may also be possible that all of the co-
offenders involved in particular crime escape detection and, even when captured, offenders 
maintain a sense of loyalty by not ‘snitching’ on their partners (e.g., Anderson, 1999; 
Rosenfeld, Jacobs, & Wright, 2003). This gap in reporting is further compounded by the 
fact that there are a variety of reasons that explain why individuals do not report being 
victimized, which may or may not be associated with whether individuals were victimized 
by more than one offender. Although, there is some evidence suggesting that victimizat ions 
by more than one offender are more likely to be reported to the police than victimizat ions 
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by a single offender (Baumer & Lauritsen, 2010). Among cases with valid information on 
whether more than one offender was involved in a reported victimization, approximate ly 
56% of criminal incidents that involve more than one offender were reported to the police, 
whereas 41% of criminal incidents that involve a single offender were reported to the 
police. This confirms prior evidence suggesting that group crime was more likely to come 
to the attention of law enforcement, however, still nearly 44% of crimes involving mult ip le 
offenders were not reported to the police. As a result, past research that has attempted to 
assess whether macro-level factors influenced the likelihood of co-offending and have 
relied on official records may be poorly estimating these relationships due to the significant 
and systematic variation in the likelihood that crimes involving more than one offender 
were reported to the police. Additionally, the few studies that have used official records 
have several limitations that preclude firm conclusions on the relationship between macro-
level factors and co-offending. Tillyer and Tillyer (2015) focused exclusively on robbery 
which tends to have higher likelihood of being reported to the police and implicates many 
of the key processes related to the instrumental decision to take on criminal accomplices. 
D’Alessio and Stolzenberg (2010) only included 184 cities that reported NIBRS data for 
all 12 months during the year 2000 and had a population of 25,000 or more. Although they 
acknowledged that NIBRS data represented a small percentage of the U.S. population, this 
study is further limited by not considering the longitudinal impacts associated with 
economic hardship. The NCVS includes a range of criminal incidents – reported or 
otherwise – and enables a longitudinal analysis. 
Thus, the NCVS offers an opportunity to utilize victimization data to substantive ly 
contribute to the discussion on co-offending. Hough (1987: 366) argued (using the British 
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Crime Survey) that relying on victim surveys can actually provide insight into the offender 
decision making process and may actually serve as a “counterweight to the picture of 
[crime] in popular mythology.” While most scholars have not necessarily answered this 
call to action, victimization surveys such as the BCS and NCVS offer insight into crimina l 
events and offending that are clearly not captured by official records. Ultimately, the goal 
of this dissertation is to utilize the relatively rich level of incident- level information and 
the ability to situate co-offenses into context in order to advance our understanding of co-
offending. 
BJS and the Census Bureau have created an aggregate level NCVS-NCS data file 
at the MSA-level (1990-2004), which provides the opportunity to associate aggregate 
victim reports of criminal incidents that involve more than one offender to a number of 
MSAs across the United States. This data file contains both a weighted person-based file, 
and a weighted incident-based file, which contain the "core" counties within the top 40 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) (See Appendix A for full list). According to 
ICPSR/BJS, the core counties were defined as those self-representing primary sampling 
units that are common to the MSA definitions determined by the Office of Management 
and Budget. Collectively, the core counties represent nearly 40 percent of the U.S. 
population. The incident-based file contains select incident- level factors variables, 
including whether more than one offender was involved in the victimization from January 
1990 through December 2004. The total number of MSA-period observations was also 
reduced because three MSAs were missing incident- level information for the years 1991 
and 1992. There is a total MSA-period sample size of N=594. 
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The NCVS MSA-data provides sub-national and longitudinal estimates of co-
offending. MSAs have been utilized in past research across a number of disciplines and 
has been argued to be a relevant unit of analysis for considering the role of labor, housing, 
education, and other social institutions (e.g., Bound & Holzer, 2000; Laeven & Popov, 
2016; McCall, 2001). The reach and impact of many of these social institutions often 
surpass city and even county boundaries, suggesting a need to consider a slightly broader 
geographic coverage (e.g., Burr et al., 1992; Crutchfield et al., 1982). Still, recent advances 
in hotspots and place-based criminology have argued for the saliency of micro-places in 
explaining variation in crime and risks to crime (e.g. Weisburd, Groff, & Yang, 2012). 
These efforts have provided significant advances in understanding the identification of hot 
spots and the crime prevention strategies. While it would be ideal to evaluate these 
relationships at lower levels of aggregation (i.e., block level), the current analyses are 
limited to evaluating the relationship between economic hardship and co-offending at the 
level of MSAs. Further, the theoretical expectations for the research question investiga t ing 
the relationship between economic hardship and crime do not demand a micro-leve l 
evaluation (e.g., Tremblay, 1993). If changes in economic hardship are related to co-
offending at the MSA-level, one could further argue for narrowing the unit of analysis to 
have a more precise understanding of the spatial distribution of co-offenses.  The proposed 
dissertation seeks to contribute to the relative void in co-offending literature on the role of 
macro-level contexts in facilitating criminal cooperation. 
As mentioned, beginning in 1992 the NCVS (NCS) underwent a significant 
redesign to incorporate new questions and integrate newer survey methodology techniques. 
The primary impetus of this redesign was based on criticisms that the NCVS did not do an 
52 
 
adequately capture intimate-partner violence. Comparisons of the NCVS and NCS 
indicated that a much larger number of rapes, aggravated assaults, simple assaults, and 
nonstranger violence were captured with the NCVS (Kindermann, Lynch, & Cantor, 1997). 
Because the MSA-level data file includes years prior to and after the redesign, crime 
estimates from years before 1992 need to be adjusted in order to produce comparable rates 
to those generated from the NCVS. Kindermann, Lynch, and Cantor (1997) developed 
crime ratios for each crime type so that the victimization rates from the years prior to 1992 
can be weighted to enable comparisons of crime trends over time. Specifically, estimates 
for crime rates in the NCS were adjusted such that estimates for aggravated assault were 
multiplied by 1.23, 1.75 for simple assault, and 1.0 for robbery. An additional concern with 
the estimating rates of victimization is that both the NCS and NCVS classified incidents as 
a ‘series victimization’ if there more than three incidents of the same type for the NCS and 
six or more incidents were the same type for the NCVS. As noted by Xie et al. (2012), only 
3% of incidents in the years 1980-2004 were classified as series incidents and the MSA-
level data do not contain information about the number of times the same type of incident 
occurred. Therefore, series incidents are included in the MSA-level data and are counted 
as a single incident.  
Analytic Plan  
Cantor and Land (1985) developed a model of the effect of economic hardship on 
crime and separated the total effect into motivational and opportunity components. 
Specifically, Cantor and Land (1985) argued that the effect of economic hardship on 
motivation emerged over time, whereas the effect on opportunity occurred immediate ly. 
The development of this model has led to the proliferation of research interested in the 
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relationship between economic hardship and crime, but also triggered a significant 
challenge of Cantor and Land’s (1985) empirical specification of this relationship (e.g., 
Greenberg, 2001; Hale & Sabbagh, 1991; Phillips & Land, 2012).  Greenberg (2001) raised 
several issues with the Cantor and Land (1985) model, including modeling of theoretical 
statements, statistical misspecification, and the identification of units of analysis. A full 
review of the details of the debate that has occurred over the past few decades is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation, however, the proposed dissertation intends to leverage some 
of the responses to the criticisms of this debate in order to test the relationship between 
economic hardship and co-offending. In particular, emphasis is placed on ensuring that the 
hypothesized predictions are appropriately specified in the model and care is taken to 
consider the implications of working with time-series panel data that are being used in the 
proposed analyses. Andresen (2012, 2015) has developed a hybrid-model that addressed 
several of the criticisms levied against the Cantor and Land model. In particular, the model 
includes empirical corollaries for the long-and-short term effects of economic hardship on 
crime that are consistent with the theoretical predictions and also accounts for the non-
stationary nature of crime and measures of economic hardship. 
The theoretical model put forth by Cantor and Land (1985), which specifies that 
the lagged or long-term effect of motivation and the contemporaneous or short-term effect 
of opportunity should have opposite directions on the overall crime rate can be specified 
as follows, using the unemployment rate as the measure of economic hardship: 
𝐶𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑡 +  𝐵2∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑡 +  𝛾𝑍𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡                                                        (1) 
where 𝐶𝑡  is the crime rate at time t, 𝛼 is the intercept, 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑡 is the 
unemployment rate at time t, 𝛽1 is the estimated parameter for contemporaneous 
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unemployment, ∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑡  is the difference operator, 𝐵2 is the estimated parameter for 
lagged unemployment. Andresen (2012) illustrated that Cantor and Land (1985) specified 
the motivational effect on crime as the difference in crime between time t and time 𝑡𝑡−1  
(𝐵2𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑡  - 𝐵2𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑡−1). The motivational effect is not necessarily a lagged 
term as described by Cantor and Land (1985) and Andresen (2012) argued that the 
parameters used by Cantor and Land (1985) do not enable the effects of the long and short 
run processes to be properly identified.  
Andresen (2012) stated that in order to identify the motivational effect of 
unemployment on crime a statistical method that captures long term relationships must be 
implemented. An ecological cross-sectional term is used to account for this long term 
relationship, as individuals who are embedded within areas with levels of economic 
hardship that are on average higher than other areas are anticipated to have greater 
motivation for crime. Thus, in any given year these individuals are expected to be “further 
along a continuum according to their levels of motivation for criminal behavior” 
(Andresen, 2012: 1617). In order to also model the effect of opportunity, Andresen (2012) 
employed a fixed effects estimation strategy that was able to identify the contemporaneous 
effect of unemployment on crime. Levitt (2001: 382) has argued that by using a fixed -
effects estimation approach in panel data, “only the short-term relationships between the 
variables will be reflected in the parameter estimates.”  
In developing a model that accommodates both long-and-short term effects of 
economic hardship, which are consistent with how economic hardship affects motivat ion 
and opportunity for crime, Andresen (2012) specified a hybrid or decomposition model 
that enabled the simultaneous estimation of these different effects: 
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𝑌𝑗𝑡 =∝ + 𝛽?̅?𝑗 + 𝑦(𝑋𝑗𝑘 − ?̅?𝑗) + 𝜀                                                                                              (2) 
where 𝑌𝑗𝑡 is the logarithm of a crime rate in a geographic area 𝑗 at time 𝑡, ∝ is the common 
intercept, 𝛽 is the estimated parameter for the motivational or long-run effect of variable 
𝑋𝑗, 𝑦 is the estimated parameter for the opportunity or short-run effect of variable 𝑋 that is 
conceptualized as the deviation from its average value over the entire time frame of the 
data. Andresen (2012) evaluated this hybrid model using data from census tracts in the 
Vancouver Census Metropolitan Area and found results consistent with those origina l ly 
hypothesized by Cantor and Land (1985). Specifically, the long-run impact of 
unemployment on property and violent crimes was statistically significant and positive. 
The short-run effect was consistently negative for all crime types, but, was only statistica l ly 
significant for property crime. Subsequent work by Andresen (2013, 2015) has generated 
similar consistency in the findings and the validity of this model across other levels of 
aggregation.  
This model provides a number of benefits because it incorporates the major 
theoretical predictions originally proposed by Cantor and Land (1985), but further 
introduces statistical methods that enable the complexity of their arguments to be 
appropriately modeled. In particular, this model integrates statistical methods to evaluate  
both the long-term effects of motivation and more short-term effects of opportunity that 
are intimately tied to the nature of co-offending. The model developed by Andresen (2012) 
will be utilized in order to specify the impact that economic hardship has on co-offending 
utilizing the NCVS MSA-level data from 1990-2004. As stated in the proposed hypotheses, 
the decomposed effect of economic hardship on co-offending is expected to operate 
somewhat differently across crime types and by the outcome of co-offending. Therefore, 
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the hybrid model will have be to several times in order to accommodate the different 
outcomes.  
One additional challenge associated with the analytic plan is that the proportion of 
total crime that is committed by more than one offender is a limited dependent variable 
that violates some of the assumptions of ordinary linear regression. In particular, because 
the proportion of total crime that is committed in groups is bounded between 0 and 1, OLS 
approaches could predict outcomes that are below 0 and above 1 and result in severely 
biased estimates of explanatory terms. Further, it assumes that the processes which 
generate variation in the outcome are constant throughout the entire distribution of the 
outcome. Papke and Wooldridge (1996) recently referred to these types of variables as 
fractional response variables. A number of solutions to this issue have been proposed. 
Scholars have proposed first presenting descriptive information on the occurrence of the 
bounded values (0, 1) and then modeling the continuous component of the outcome using 
the beta distribution (e.g., Paolino, 2001). These two-step modeling approaches essentially 
discount or exclude the contribution of values at the bounds, which may be problematic 
depending on the dependent variable under study (Cook et al., 2008). Alternative ly, 
scholars have utilized a logistic transformation of the proportion outcome because it 
ensures that the predictive values remain between 0 and 1 and approximates a lineariza t ion 
of the outcome. In particular, there is nearly a linear transformation of proportions between 
.20 and .80, whereas values close to 0 and 1 are spread out at an increasing rate. One 
drawback to this approach is that values that fall on the bounds of 0 and 1 are inherently 
excluded unless these values are transformed by the addition of a small constant (Cook et 
al., 2008).  
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More advanced analytical approaches have been developed to address these 
limitations, which require the specification of the nonlinear functional form of the 
proportion outcome. Papke and Wooldridge (1996) proposed the use of a quasi-maximum 
likelihood estimators to estimate models that utilize proportion outcomes without 
implementing a transformation of the outcome. This modeling strategy is considered to be 
an extension of the general linear model and is able to simultaneously account for the 
bounded nature of the dependent variable and ensures that predicted values remain within 
the limits of the variable. One of the main limitations of this modeling approach is that 
because it explicitly accounts for the non-linear nature of the model, interpretation of the 
point estimates is restricted and require the calculation of average marginal effects. 
Proponents of this approach argue that this enables a consideration of the average effects 
at different percentiles of the distribution of the outcome, which may be informative in 
understanding whether the impact of certain covariates is constant across variation in the 
outcome (e.g., Papke and Wooldridge, 1996). However, for the purposes of the hybrid 
modeling strategy utilized in this dissertation, the calculation of marginal effects becomes 
problematic (Schunck, 2013). The inclusion of both a between-and within unit estimator 
into a model raises the questions of whether the predicted values derived from margina l 
effects should be based on the between or within components of the model and what values 
each of the covariates should be set to. More specifically, each of the between and within 
components of the covariates in the model are comprised either fully or in part by their 
mean value over the study period, which is often used to estimate the average margina l 
effects of covariates. Given the relative nascence of the hybrid modeling strategy and 
limited methodological testing for how it might be integrated into a fractional response 
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framework, fractional response models would result in providing uninterpretable results 
that would inhibit an understanding of the magnitude of the estimates. 
In order to evaluate the relationship between the short and long term effects of 
economic hardship and the proportion of group crime, such that each hypothesis can be 
tested and discussed in relation to the rate of group crime, this dissertation opts to utilize a 
logistic transformation of the proportion outcome. As discussed, this approach has been 
previously used to accommodate a proportion outcome and also generates interpretab le 
estimates (Baum, 2008; McDowell & Cox, 2001). In doing so, the analytic model is able 
to retain the specifications associated with the hybrid model and provide point estimates 
for the long and short term effects of economic hardship. To address the fact that a logist ic 
transformation of a proportion outcome excludes values at the bounds [0, 1], a small 
constant value that is defined by the lowest proportion of group crime for each crime type 
is added to the lower bound and subtracted from the upper bound.3Additionally, because 
of the fact that heteroskedastic errors are often observed in proportion dependent variables, 
robust standard errors are calculated for each of these models. Given the analyt ica l 
challenges associated with a dependent variable that is a proportion, the robustness of the 
findings were confirmed with the inclusion of sensitivity analyses. These analyses are 
presented in an Appendix and include modeling the proportion outcome in an OLS 
regression, beta regression, and also in a fractional response model (see Appendix 2). 
                                                                 
3 It is important to note that the bounds present in the proportion outcome may represent distorted values 
that are derived from the sampling procedure utilized in the NCVS to generate aggregate-level estimates of 
victimization experiences. If an MSA is estimated to have zero group crime in a given year, this may be 
driven by the fact that among the relatively small number of households interviewed – and that had valid 
data on whether or not more than one offender was involved in a victimization experience – there were no 
incidents of reported group crime. One could argue that it would be unreasonable to expect that in a given 
year there would be zero incidents of group crime in an entire MSA. Still, this low estimate of group crime 
may still signal that an MSA experienced a non-negligible, but small amount of group crime. Therefore, 
observations at the bounds are retained to ensure a robust sample size. 
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Importantly, although the magnitude of the estimates vary across the modeling strategy, 
the direction and statistical significance of the main predictor variables are largely 
consistent. 
Lastly, there is an important data constraint that raises some concerns over the 
generalizability and validity of the results. The MSA-level data captures core-counties 
within the overall NCVS survey. Although these counties represent nearly 40% of the US 
population once the sampling design is accounted for, the number of respondents and 
reported incidents within some MSAs that are used to estimate MSA-level victimiza t ion 
rates are relatively small. This raises concerns over a lack of statistical power to produce 
aggregate estimates of co-offending. Solutions to this concern generate tension between 
maintaining construct validity of the theoretical concepts (i.e., motivation and opportunity) 
and specifying a robust empirical model. One possible approach to addressing the small 
sample sizes within each MSA in any given year would be to pool the MSA data over time. 
Cantor and Land (1985, 2001) cited evidence suggesting that recovery from economic 
recessions may occur over two-year business cycle, which might provide support for 
pooling the available data across two years of data. Most recently, Xie et al. (2012) pooled 
the MSA-level NCVS data across five-year intervals to address both the small sample size 
and to account for fluctuations around unemployment and crime trends. Still, Cantor and 
Land (1985) and their critics convincingly argue that the delayed effect of unemployment 
on crime beyond a year would be illogical because of the inconsistent evidence in a one-
year lagged effect (Greenberg, 2001).  
Thus, pooling data across years could lead to a distortion in the construct valid ity 
for both processes in the model. Scholars generally agree that the effects of unemployment 
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on crime (and co-offending) can be categorized into long and short-term components. If 
data are pooled together over a number of years, the construct validity of what is considered 
a short-term opportunity effect or a long-term motivation effect is weakened. Cantor and 
Land’s (1985) initial formulation of the opportunity effect specifically made quite clear 
that the timing was contemporaneous with shifts in the economic business cycle. Even 
pooling data across two to three years raises questions about the distinction between the 
two components of the unemployment and crime model. Nonetheless, one must grapple 
with the fact that some MSAs do not contain many cases (e.g., West Palm Beach-Boca 
Baton, FL contains 416 cases across all the 14 years of data). In order to balance 
maintaining the specified theoretical arguments and developing a robust empirical model, 
several sets of analyses will be conducted in order to assess the consistency of the results. 
Consistent with past research that has used annual estimates, the analyses will first proceed 
with a model that evaluates the impact of economic hardship on group crime in a single 
year. Subsequent analyses will continue to increase the number of years that are pooled 
until three years of data are pooled.  
Measures 
 
Dependent Variables  
 Consistent with the hypotheses, it is expected that there will be differences in the 
relationship between economic hardship and co-offending across instrumental and 
expressive crime types. The NCVS collects information on nonfatal personal crimes (rape 
or sexual assault, robbery, aggravated and simple assault, personal larceny) and household 
property crime (burglary, motor vehicle theft, and other theft). Instrumental crimes, or 
crimes that involve the potential for monetary gain, include the following offenses : 
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robbery, personal larceny, burglary, motor vehicle theft, and other theft. One important 
distinction to make across these crime categories is the unit of analysis. Among the 
personal crimes (i.e., robbery, personal larceny) the unit of analysis is the individua l 
respondent, whereas for household instrumental crimes (i.e., burglary, motor vehicle theft, 
other left) the unit of analysis is the entire household. As a result of this difference, 
instrumental crimes that involve more than one offender will be divided into personal and 
household based instrumental crimes. Expressive crimes will include person based 
aggravated and simple assaults. Because of the relatively low prevalence of rape or sexual 
assault and the substantively different nature of this type of crime as it may relate to co-
offending, it is excluded from the construction of expressive crimes for this dissertation. It 
is important to note that the delineation between instrumental and expressive crimes is not 
meant to reify these crime categories, but rather is consistent with prior work evaluating 
the relationship between economic hardship and unemployment and can provide insight 
into the potentially unique implications co-offending has across various crime types (i.e., 
McCord & Conway, 2002; Weerman, 2003).  
 Rate of Co-offending. Consistent with the hypothesized relationships between 
economic hardship and co-offending, across certain crime types there is an expectation that 
the overall volume of co-offending would change. For instance, economic hardship is 
expected to be positively related to the rate of instrumental co-offending in the long- term 
because motivation to engage in co-offenses that involves monetary gain takes time to 
develop and experiencing adversity leads offenders to become more willing to take on 
accomplices. Figure 1 shows the trends in time of the weighted count of co-offending 
incidents across MSAs. Because of the NCVS re-design, two formulas were used to 
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calculate estimates of the rate of co-offending. Annual estimates for each MSA from 1993 
to 2004 will be calculated based on the following formula: 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 12 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑡  /1000
 
           Figure 1: Count of Co-offending Incidents by MSA, N=594 
 
 
Annual estimates for MSAs between 1979 and 1992 will be calculated based on the 
following formula, where 𝑤𝑐  is the weight for each crime type:  
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 =
𝑤𝑐 ∗  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑡




Proportion of Co-offending.  Under conditions of economic adversity the 
advantages and shift in preferences associated with co-offending is expected to affect the 
proportion of co-offenses committed. For each MSA, the incident records will also be used 
to generate an estimated proportion of offenses that involved multiple offenders. Figure 2 
shows the trends over time of the weighted proportion of co-offending incidents.  For all 
of the years in the dataset, the proportion of offenses that are co-offenses will be calculated 
by the following formula4: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡











                                                                 
4 In the calculation of a proportion of co-offenses, the weighting procedure used to provide comparable 
estimates of crimes before and after 1992 would be applied to both the numerator and the denominator. As 








 Economic Hardship. Over the past decade, there has been a relatively expansive 
growth in empirical analyses that seek to understand the role of economic hardship and 
crime. Primarily, much of this research relies on the unemployment rate as a measure of 
the state of the economy. This decision is largely guided by the fact that scholars have 
continued to test and refine Cantor and Land’s (1985) original model, which argued in 
support of the use of the unemployment rate. Still, a number of additional studies have 
questioned the use of the unemployment rate and have replaced this measure with 
alternatives, including: 1) the gross state product or gross domestic product (Arvanites & 
DeFina, 2006; Rosenfeld & Fornango, 2007), 2) consumer sentiment (Rosenfeld & 
65 
 
Fornango, 2007), 3) average wages (Yearwood & Koinis, 2011), and measures of low 
income (e.g., Andresen & Linning, 2015). Use of measures other than the rate of 
unemployment are largely based on the argument that there are a number of limitat ions 
attached to this measure and it does not accurately capture the state of the economy and 
overlooks segments of the population that may turn to crime in the face of hardship. 
 As defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2014: 10), unemployed individua ls 
include “All those [individuals] who did not have a job at all during the survey reference 
week, made at least one specific active effort to find a job during the prior 4 weeks, and 
were available for work (unless temporarily ill). All those who were not working and were 
waiting to be called back to a job from which they had been laid off.” Greenberg (2001) 
suggests that this definition excludes a number individuals, including: 1) those who become 
discouraged because they have given up on finding a job or never sought to obtain 
employment in the first place, 2) stay at home parents or students who are not working or 
looking for a job, 3) workers who make extremely low wages or may be involved in the 
secondary labor market. Exclusion of these segments of the population are important for 
understanding the relationship between economic hardship and crime because individua ls 
within these categories may be most likely to turn to crime to meet the demands of living 
expenditures. Cantor and Land (1985, 2001) argue that it is still a valid proxy for the overall 
state of the economic system. Additionally, as originally suggested by Tremblay (1993), 
using unemployment aligns with the theoretical predictions for the model with co-
offending as an outcome.  In order to address the limitations of a single measure of 
economic hardship, multiple alternative measures will be used including the 
unemployment rate and the percent of poverty in an area. Each of these measures attempt 
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to provide an indicator of the strength of the state of the economy in an area and have been 
used in prior research to understand the relationship with crime.  
Annual unemployment information for each of the MSAs between the years of 
1990-2004 was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The government 
conducts a monthly survey titled, the Current Population Survey (CPS), to capture the level 
of unemployment in the country. Approximately 60,000 households are eligible to be 
included in the sample and these households are selected to be representative of the entire 
population of the United States. Census Bureau employees contact the eligible sample 
members and inquire about labor force activities and non-labor force status of members of 
the household. BLS defines the unemployment rates as a percentage of the labor force that 































To overcome some of the limitations of the measure of unemployment as an 
indicator for economic hardship, a measure capturing the percentage of poverty in an 
MSA is also included. Poverty status is defined by comparing pre-tax cash income to a 
threshold that is determined by the U.S. Census Bureau and is approximately three times 
the cost of a minimum food diet. Whereas individuals experiencing poverty may be 
unemployed or included in the unemployment rate, poverty levels also capture those 
individuals that are discouraged from the labor market or participate in the secondary 
labor market and are excluded from the labor force totals used to calculate the 
employment rate. As such, a measure of poverty arguably captures a wider range of 
economic hardship that may be particularly salient in tapping into the experience of 
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adversity that alters both motivation and opportunities for crime (and criminal 
cooperation). Indeed, Vold and Bernard (1986: 138) state that it is “the lack of some 
fixed level of material goods necessary for survival and minimum well-being” that 
generates conditions conducive to crime. The measure of the percentage of poverty is 
derived from data collected through the American Community Survey (ACS) conducted 
by the Census Bureau. Specifically, the Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates 
program utilizes a combination of indicators including ACS data, federal income tax 
returns, SNAP benefits, decennial census data, postcensal population estimates, 
Supplemental Security income recipiency, and economic data from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) to generate model-based estimates of poverty levels at the 
county-level. These estimates were combined to match the core counties utilized in the 
MSA-NCVS data file to create indicators for the percentage of the population in an area 
that are below the poverty threshold. Figure 4 portrays the changes in percentage of 









Figure 4: Percent of Poverty by MSA, N=600 
 
The use of multiple measures of economic hardship enables a consideration of its 
relationship to co-offending that addresses concerns over the limitations of both 
measures. While each measure taps into the construct of economic hardship, differences 
in the unemployment rates and the percentage of poverty may not be without 
consequence. Specifically, any observed differences in the results could be driven by the 
fact that each measure may be differentially related to long-term processes associated 
with motivation and short-term processes attributable to changes in the opportunity 
structure for crime. For instance, Cantor and Land (1985) explicitly described how the 
short-term effect of opportunity/guardianship was associated with the unemployment rate 
because as more people become unemployed they are more likely to spend time in home 
guarding their property and neighborhood. This association is inextricably tied to people 
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becoming unemployed, therefore the contemporaneous impact of rising unemployment 
on opportunity/guardianship may be most salient for this measure of economic hardship. 
It is likely the case that poverty levels in an MSA also capture the extent to which people 
are unemployed or underemployed and spending time at home, however, the conceptual 
link between the short-term changes in guardianship articulated by Cantor and Land 
(1985) is not as immediately associated with increasing poverty levels. Similar arguments 
can be made with respect to thinking about the long-term effects associated with 
motivation. Both the unemployment rate and the percentage of poverty arguably serve as 
indicators of the extent of adversity experienced in an area that may lead individuals to 
become more motivated to engage in criminal activity.  
If, as Cantor and Land (1985) argued, more than just those who become 
unemployed experience adverse consequences of a declining economy, the percentage of 
poverty may capture a deeper sense of adversity beyond that of the unemployment rate. 
One of the major limitations of the unemployment rate was that it inherently excludes 
individuals (i.e., those discouraged from the labor market) that may be most relevant for 
understanding patterns of criminal activity. To be sure, at a global level, the correlation 
between the unemployment rate and the percentage of poverty within an MSA is .548 
(p<.001), which suggests that there is a fairly strong relationship between these two 
measures. Nonetheless, observed differences in the findings across measures of economic 
hardship may reflect how these different measures uniquely tap into processes related to 
motivation and opportunity.  
Control Variables  
Ecological Controls. Consistent with past research that has sought to evaluate the 
relationship between unemployment and crime, it is important to control for several area-
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level factors that may be related to rates of co-offending and criminal activity generally. 
Age is not only strongly correlated with criminal behavior, but also has been demonstrated 
to be related to the likelihood of co-offending (e.g., Farrington, 1986; Gottfredson & 
Hirschi, 1990; McCord & Conway, 2002). In order to account for this, measures of the 
percentage of the population between the ages of 15 and 24 years of age were included as 
a control. It is also hypothesized that the short-and long-term processes associated with 
increases in economic hardship may be moderated by the age-distribution of an MSA. As 
a result, two interaction terms are included in the analyses. The first interacts the between-
and within-measures of economic hardship with the percentage of the MSA that is between 
the ages of 15 and 24 years old, which is consistent with prior arguments suggesting that 
the impact of economic hardship may be most salient among those seeking to enter the 
adult labor market. Alternatively, the between-and within-measures of economic hardship 
are interacted with the percentage of the MSA that is between the ages of 25 and 44 years 
old to evaluate whether these processes may be more important among those most likely 
to be in the adult labor market and responsible for their own financial well-being. Although 
this is a relatively crude distinction in the age-profile of an MSA, there is limited variation 
in smaller categories of age over time within the MSA, which diminishes the ability to 
detect within-MSA changes in the potential moderating relationship.  Some evidence 
suggests that black individuals are more likely to engage in co-offending, therefore the 
percentage of the population in an MSA that is black will be controlled for (Andresen & 
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Felson, 2010; Lynch, 2002; McCord & Conway, 2002). Data for these control variables 
will be obtained by the U.S. Census Bureau5. 
 Trend Variables. One of the major criticisms levied against Cantor and Land (1985) 
was that they did not adequately address the fact that they did not address trends in crime 
rates (e.g., Greenberg, 2001). In order to account for the trends in both unemployment and 
crime data, a linear and quadratic time trend variables will be included as controls 
(Andresen, 2015; Raphael & Winter-Ebmer, 2001). 
Single Offender Crime Rate. In order to discern the independent effect of 
unemployment on co-offending from crime generally, it is necessary to also account for 
the crime rate. This also provides a control for any year to year fluctuations in crime rate 
trends that can cause specification issues in time-series panel data (e.g., Greenberg, 2001; 
Hale & Sabbagh, 1991). Still, because group crime is part of the overall crime committed 
in an area, including a measure of the overall crime rate would essentially be including the 
major dependent variable as part of an independent variable. To address this and attempt 
to isolate the role that macro-level conditions of economic hardship have in explaining 
group crime, the total single-offender offense rate will be included as a control variable.   
In order to calculate the single-offender crime rates in each MSA, a similar formula used 
to calculate the rate of co-offending victimization will be used. This single-offender crime 
rate will only include offenses that also enables a victim-offender interaction to be 
                                                                 
5 While it would be ideal to include a wide range of control variables, it is difficult to identify control 
variables that are essentially available at the county-level that are related to the outcomes of interest. 
Because the MSAs created by the NCVS may differ from the MSA categorization used by the Census 
Bureau, existing data may not necessarily correspond to the configuration of an MSA in the NCVS. In 
addition, the single-offender crime rate in some of the models serves as a relatively strong control for many 
of the processes that would also be related to group crime.  
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consistent with the rate of co-offending. This essentially only excludes intimate partner 
violence or other sexual assaults. Additionally, consistent with the fact that the analyses 
will be divided by crime type, the single-offender crime rate will also correspond to the 
same group crime outcome. This control variable will also only be included in the rate of 
group crime models because the numerator of the single-offender crime rate is inherently 
part of the denominator of the proportion outcome. Because the denominator of the 
proportion outcome is comprised of the total number of solo-and group based offenses, the 
outcome would inherently be a function of this control variable.  
𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡
=
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 12 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑡  /1000
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Variables6 
 N Mean Standard Deviation 
Variable     
Logged Overall Group Crime 
Rate 
540 2.28 .65 
Logged Overall Solo Crime 
Rate 
540 10.95 .72 
Logged Group Household 
Property Crime Rate 
474 1.09 .66 
Logged Solo Household 
Property Crime Rate 
474 2.20 .48 
Logged Group Personal 
Instrumental Crime Rate 
533 1.15 .71 
Logged Solo Personal 
Instrumental Crime 
533 1.46 .67 
Logged Group Expressive 
Crime Rate 
450 1.70 .71 
Logged Solo Expressive 
Crime Rate 
450 3.03 .53 
Overall Proportion of Group 
Crime 
540 .24 .10 
                                                                 
6 Missing data was handled through listwise deletion. All of the missing data occurs because for certain 
MSAs there were either too few a number of respondents with valid data or respondents which reported 
zero victimizations of certain crime types.  
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Proportion of Group 
Household Crime 
474 .22 .14 
Proportion of Group Personal 
Instrumental Crime 
533 .41 .27 
Proportion of Group 
Expressive Crime 
450 .20 .11 
Percentage of Poverty 600 11.87 3.49 
Rate of Unemployment 600 5.20 1.59 
Percent 15 to 24 600 13.40 1.31 
Percent 25 to 44 600 32.80 2.50 
Percent Black 600 14.99 8.76 




CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
  
 The presentation of the results proceeds first by examining the set of models that 
focus on evaluating the relationship between economic hardship and the overall rate of co-
offending and is followed by the set of models examining the relationship between 
economic hardship and the overall proportion of crime that is committed by more than one 
offender. As previously mentioned, there is reason to believe that the short-and long- term 
processes associated with economic hardship are differentially related to various crime 
types7. Therefore, the results are first examined by looking at the rate of overall co-
offending and the proportion of overall crimes that are co-offenses, followed by models 
that are divided by crime type. Each of these models also are tested across several measures 
of economic hardship (i.e., unemployment rate, percent of poverty) and are evaluated to 
determine whether the age-distribution of an MSA moderates the short- and long- term 
processes associated with economic hardship.8 
Rate of Co-offending Results 
  
 Table 2 presents the results for the model using the overall rate of co-offending as 
an outcome. Across the models, the short-and long-term relationship between 
unemployment and the overall rate of co-offending is not statistically significant. Thus, 
there is limited support for the overall hypotheses that suggest there will be a positive 
relationship between the long-term impact associated with motivation (Hypothesis 1) and 
a positive relationship between the short-term impact associated with 
                                                                 
7 Consistent with Cantor and Land’s (1985) theoretical arguments, the long -term effect of economic 
hardship refers to a motivational influence and the short-term effect refers to the influence of opportunity.  
8 Each of the models presented were tested for serial auto-correlation and heteroskedastic errors. There was 
no evidence to suggests that these factors impacted the results of the analyses. Additionally, the time trend 
variables are excluded from the presentation of the results as they do not substantively affect the 
interpretation of the findings and are meant to account for trends in the data. 
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opportunity/guardianship (Hypothesis 2) and rate of co-offending. Interestingly, the only 
statistically significant predictor is the decomposed relationship between the overall rate 
of solo-crime and the rate of co-offending. In essence, this suggests that MSAs that on 
average have higher rates of solo crime also have higher rates of co-offending and those 
MSAs that experience short-run increases in the rate of solo-crime also experience positive 
increases in the rate of co-offending. This is not totally surprising, as it implies that 
conditions that lead to increases in solo-offending are simultaneously related to conditions 
that produce co-offending. The lack of statistically significant findings for the overall rate 
of co-offending further suggests that the processes triggered by economic hardship may be 
differentially related to certain crime types.  
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p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*, p<.10† 




 Table 3 presents a similar set of results when using the percentage of the MSA that 
is at or below the poverty level as an indicator of economic hardship. The decomposed 
relationship between the rate of solo-offending and the rate of co-offending is statistica l ly 
significant across all of the models, indicating a strong relationship between these forms of 
arguably interdependent behaviors. Of note, in the baseline model 3a the short-term effect 
of poverty is statistically significant and positively related to the overall rate of co-
offending. For every one-unit increase in short-term increases in the percentage of poverty, 
the expected rate of co-offending increases by nearly 5.4% (exp^.053). This suggests that 
within-MSA increases in the percentage of poverty induces short term increase in the rate 
of co-offending, which is consistent with the expectation that there would be a more 
contemporaneous demand for co-offending given the decline in the quality of crimina l 
opportunities and an increased convergence of offenders in space in time (Hypothesis 3).  
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p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*, p<.10† 
*Time trends are included in the models, however are not presented in the results.  
 
The next set of results separate out the long-and short-term relationship between 
each indicator of economic hardship and three types of co-offending – household property 
crime, personal instrumental crime, and expressive crime. Table 4 presents the results for 
household property co-offending and the unemployment rate as an indicator of economic 
hardship. As a reminder, the long-term effect captured by a between-unit estimator 
represents the motivation effect devised by Cantor and Land (1985), and the short-term 
effect captured by a within-unit estimator represents the opportunity effect. As can be seen 
in Model 4a, consistent with Hypothesis 1a changes in long-term motivation due to 
increase in economic hardship are statistically significant and positively related to the rate 
of household property co-offending. An interpretation of the long term impact of higher 
levels of unemployment suggests that for every 1% increase in the average unemployment 
level of a MSA over the period, the rate of household property co-offending increases by 
7.4% (exp^.071). Additionally, as hypothesized by Hypothesis 3a, there is not a statistica l ly 
significant relationship between the unemployment rate and the rate of household property 
co-offending. Models 4b and 4c evaluate whether or not the impact of unemployment on 
the rate of household property co-offending interacts with the age-distribution of an area. 
The results from Model 4b indicates that there is small, but statically significant and 
positive moderating impact of the percentage of the MSA between the ages 15-24, such 
that a one-unit increase in the within-MSA deviation of this age profile increases the 
expected impact of increases in the short-term effect of unemployment by 4.4%. The only 
other consistently statistically significant control variable is the short-term impact of the 
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rate of single-offender crimes. This positive relationship suggests that areas whose rate of 
single-offender crimes in a given year is higher than its average over the 14 year time 
period also have a substantive increase in the rate of household property co-offending.  
Table 4: Hybrid Model for Rate of Household Property Co-offending, 
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p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*, p<.10† 
*Time trends are included in the models, however are not presented in the results.  
 
 Table 5 presents models using percent of poverty in the MSA as the indicator for 
economic hardship. Interestingly, some different results emerge. As seen in the baseline 
model, both the long term motivation effect and the short term effect of 
opportunity/guardianship are both statistically significant and positively related to the rate 
of household property co-offending. Consistent with Hypothesis 1a, the long term effect of 
motivation indicates that for every one-unit increase in the average percentage of poverty 
of an area, there is nearly 3.3% increase in the average rate of household property co-
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offending. In contrast to the hypothesized null relationship in Hypothesis 3a, a 1% increase 
in within-MSA percentage of poverty leads to an increase in the rate of household property 
co-offending by about 6.9%. This finding suggests that perhaps the percentage of poverty 
captures a differential set of short-term processes related to co-offending and indicates that 
under increasingly adverse conditions of poverty, changing opportunity structures for 
crime leads co-offending to be seen as a more viable option. The interactions between the 
percentage of poverty and age distribution of an MSA suggest that there is not a moderating 
impact of the age distribution on the rate of household property co-offending. As observed 
in Model 5a, within-MSA increases in the percentage of male residents was margina l ly 
significant and positively related to the rate of household property co-offending, which 
aligns with the fact that crime is typically committed by males. 
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p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*, p<.10† 
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*Time trends are included in the models, however are not presented in the results.  
 
 Table 6 presents the results for the rate of personal instrumental co-offending and 
the unemployment rate as the indicator for economic hardship. Examining the coefficients 
for the long term and short term effects of unemployment on the rate of personal 
instrumental co-offending indicates that neither of the relationships are statistica l ly 
significant by traditional standards, however, both are marginally significant. Consistent 
with Hypothesis 1a, a 1% increase in the average level of unemployment in an MSA is 
associated with a marginally significant 6.8% increase in the rate of personal instrumenta l 
co-offending. In contrast to the null relationship hypothesized by Hypothesis 3a, there is 
also a marginally significant and positive relationship between the short term effect of 
unemployment associated with opportunity/guardianship and the rate of personal 
instrumental co-offending. Specifically, a 1% increase in within-MSA unemployment is 
associated with a 4.7% increase in the rate of personal instrumental co-offending. Again, 
perhaps this positive relationship suggests that macro-level conditions triggered by more 
short term changes associated with unemployment generate convergence settings or 
opportunities that are conducive to co-offending despite increases in the level of 
guardianship. Consistent with several of the models of household property co-offending, 
the unemployment rate is not consistently moderated by the age distribution of an MSA in 
the explanation of the rate of personal instrumental co-offending. Across each of the 
models, MSAs that have on average a higher percentage of the population that is black 








Table 6: Hybrid Model for Rate of Personal Instrumental Co-offending, 
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p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*, p<.10† 
*Time trends are included in the models, however are not presented in the results.  
 
 Table 7 reports the results for the relationship between the percent of poverty in an 
MSA and the rate of personal instrumental co-offending. Consistent with Hypothesis 1a, 
there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between the long-term effect of 
poverty associated with motivation and the rate of personal instrumental co-offending. 
Specifically, a 1% increase in the average percent of poverty across MSAs is expected to 
lead to a 2.9% increase in the rate of personal instrumental co-offending. Inconsistent with 
Hypothesis 3b, there is also a statistically significant and positive relationship between the 
short-term effect of changes in the percentage of poverty and rate of personal instrumenta l 
co-offending. Specifically, a 1% increase in within-MSA poverty is expected to lead to a 
nearly 8.7% increase in the rate of personal instrumental co-offending net of other controls. 
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The emerging pattern of positive and statistically significant relationships in the short term 
with the rate of co-offending outcomes continues to suggest that there are processes which 
are facilitating increases in the volume of co-offending despite changes in the level of 
guardianship and opportunities for crime. The results for the interaction between the age 
profile of an MSA and the percent of poverty in an MSA indicate that the percentage of 
the MSA that is between the ages 15 and 24 moderates the relationship between poverty 
and the rate of personal instrumental co-offending. In particular, the interaction term is 
positive and statistically significant indicating that a one-unit increase in the average 
percentage of the MSA between the ages 15-24 increases the expected impact of increasing 
levels of poverty on the rate of personal instrumental co-offending by nearly 3.5%.  






with Age Profile  
 15-24 (7b) 
Interaction Model 
























































































Percent Poverty X 







Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 25-44 





p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*, p<.10† 




 These last set of results for the rate of co-offending pertain to the relationship 
between indicators of economic hardship and the rate of expressive co-offending. As a 
reminder, in formulating the hypotheses by crime type it was expected that there may be 
differences in the expected direction or presence of relationships for expressive co-
offending. Table 8 presents the results using the unemployment rate as the indicator of 
economic hardship. Consistent with the specification of Hypothesis 1b for expressive 
crime, there is a null relationship between the long term effect associated with 
unemployment and the rate of expressive co-offending. As argued, there is little reason to 
expect that increases in unemployment would lead individuals to become more motivated 
to engage in expressive crime and the results provide support for this claim. There is also 
marginal support for a positive relationship between the short term effect associated with 
unemployment and the rate of expressive co-offending (Hypothesis 3b). Specifically, a 1% 
increase in within-MSA unemployment rates is expected to lead to a 5.9% increase in the 
rate of expressive co-offending. This increase was hypothesized to be attributable to the 
increased concentration of available and potentially motivated offenders in space and time. 
There were also positive and statistically significant relationships in the long and short term 
effects of the rate of single-offender expressive crimes. There is no evidence in support of 
a moderating relationship of the age-profile of the MSA across each of the specificat ions 
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p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*, p<.10† 
*Time trends are included in the models, however are not presented in the results.  
 
 Table 9 presents the results for the relationship between the long and short term 
effects associated with percent of poverty in an MSA and the rate of expressive co-
offending. Consistent with the specification of Hypothesis 2b, there is a null relationship 
between the long term impact associated with motivation and the rate of expressive co-
offending. Additionally, the statistically significant and positive relationship between the 
short term effects associated with opportunity/guardianship provides support for 
Hypothesis 3b. Specifically, a 1% increase in within-MSA percent poverty is expected to 
lead to an 8.4% increase in the rate of expressive co-offending.  Of note, the interaction 
model that includes an interaction term between the percentage of the MSA that is between 
the ages 15 to 24 and the percentage of poverty suggests that there is a moderating 
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relationship. An interpretation of the long term interaction term suggests that as the 
percentage of people aged 15 to 24 increases by one-unit, the slope for the impact of 
poverty is negatively related to the rate of expressive co-offending by about 3%. 
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p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*, p<.10† 
*Time trends are included in the models, however are not presented in the results.  
 
 As previously mentioned, there is an important limitation of the data that required 
additional attention with respect to determining the robustness of the results. In particular, 
for the some of the MSAs there are a small number of incidents included within the MSA 
that are used to generate estimates of MSA-level co-offending rates.  This raises the risk of 
statistical power in producing national estimates of co-offending, particularly when 
evaluating changes in these rates or proportions over time. In order to address some of the 
small sample sizes within each MSA in any given year, pooled analyses were conducted 
across 2 and 3 year increments replicating each of the models generated in the results 
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above. Of note, the substantive findings found in the analyses utilizing annual estimates 
were almost entirely replicated for each of the crime types and for each type of indicator 
of economic hardship. The only major difference that emerged was the level of statistica l 
significance increased for the long and short term coefficients that were statistica l ly 
significant in the models presented above. The replication of these findings ameliorate 
concerns that the results reported above were hampered or drastically impacted by 
instances of small sample size for certain MSAs. While these pooled results reflect the 
same substantive results, it becomes more difficult to interpret the meaning of long and 
short term effects when the time periods associated with these effects now extend to 2 and 
3 year intervals. These results are not presented and are included as Appendix 3. 
Proportion of Co-offending Results 
 
 The following section presents the results for each of the models examining the 
proportion of co-offending as an outcome. Table 10 presents the results for the decomposed 
relationship between unemployment and the overall proportion of crimes that are co-
offenses. As can be seen in the table, the only statistically significant relationship with the 
proportion crimes that are co-offenses is the long term effect associated with motivat ion. 
This is consistent with Hypothesis 2 that argued that individuals – both those previously 
initiated into criminal behavior and those who previously did not view crime as a viable 
option - who are embedded in MSAs with on average higher levels of economic hardship 
would become more motivated to co-offend. It is expected that for every one-unit increase 
in the rate of unemployment, the proportion of crimes that are co-offenses is expected to 
increase by 13.7% (e^.128).  There is limited support for Hypothesis 4, which argued that 
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in the short-term there would be a positive relationship between economic hardship and the 
proportion of crimes that are co-offenses. 
Table 10: Hybrid Model for Overall Proportion of Crimes that are Co-offenses, 
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p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*, p<.10† 
*Time trends are included in the models, however are not presented in the results.  
 
 Table 11 presents the results for the model evaluating the relationship between the 
long and short term effects associated with percent of poverty in an MSA and the overall 
proportion of crimes that are co-offenses. As observed in the baseline model (11a), there 
are positive and statistically significant relationships between the long-and short-term 
effects associated with changes in the percentage of poverty. In particular, on average 
MSAs with higher levels of poverty experience a 4.3% increase in the proportion of crimes 
that are co-offenses. This is consistent with Hypothesis 2, which argued that long- term 
processes associated with motivation would be positively related to the proportion of 
crimes that are co-offenses. A one-unit increase in the average percent of poverty in an 
MSA is associated with a 4.3% increase in the expected proportion of crimes that are co-
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offenses. There is marginal support for Hypothesis 4 as evidenced by the margina l ly 
significant and positive short-term effect of the percent poverty. Specifically, for every 
one-unit increase in within-MSA changes in the percentage of poverty there is an expected 
increase in the proportion of crimes that are co-offenses by 4.1%.  
Table 11: Hybrid Model for Overall Proportion of Crimes that are Co-offenses, 
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p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*, p<.10† 
*Time trends are included in the models, however are not presented in the results.  
 
 The next set of tables present the results for the proportion of crimes that are co-
offenses by crime type. Table 12 presents the results for the proportion of household 
property crimes that are co-offenses and uses the unemployment rate as a measure of 
economic hardship. Consistent with Hypothesis 2a, there is a positive and statistica l ly 
significant relationship between the long-term processes associated with motivation and 
the proportion of household property crimes that are co-offenses. Specifically, for every 
one-unit increase in the average unemployment rate there is an 11% expected increase in 
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the proportion of household property crimes that are co-offenses. In contrast to Hypothesis 
4a, there is not a positive relationship between the short-term effects associated with 
unemployment and the proportion of household property crimes that are co-offenses. Of 
note, there is only one other set of statistically significant relationships across the models 
presented in Table 12. There is evidence to suggest that the short-term effects associated 
with opportunity/guardianship is moderated by the percentage of the MSA that is between 
the ages 25 to 44. Specifically, for every one-unit increase in within-MSA deviations in 
this age demographic, the expected slope for the impact of the short-term effect of 
unemployment is expected to increase by approximately 3.7% (e^.037). Given that a 
moderating relationship has yet to emerge across most of the previously discussed models, 
this relationship is viewed tentatively. Nonetheless, it suggests that perhaps the more 
contemporaneous impact of increases in unemployment is most salient in contributing to 
individuals in this older age category view co-offending as a viable option or are more 
likely to be associated with convergent spaces that expose individuals to the opportunity to 
identify suitable co-offenders. 
Table 12: Hybrid Model for Proportion of Household Property Crimes that are Co-
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p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*, p<.10† 
*Time trends are included in the models, however are not presented in the results.  
 
Table 13 presents the results for the proportion of household property crimes that 
are co-offenses using the percentage of poverty in an MSA as the measure of economic 
hardship. Consistent with Hypothesis 2a, there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between the long-term processes associated with motivation and the 
proportion of household property crimes that are co-offenses. Specifically, for every one-
unit increase in the average unemployment rate there is a 4.2% expected increase in the 
proportion of household property crimes that are co-offenses. There is marginal support 
for Hypothesis 4a, as there is a marginally significant and positive relationship between the 
short-term effects associated with poverty and the proportion of household property crimes 
that are co-offenses. This finding is consistent with the expectation that in the short-term, 
increase in economic hardship increase the convergence of motivated offenders in space 
and time and facilitate the identification of suitable targets. None of the other control 
variables are statistically significant and there does not appear to be a moderating 
relationship between poverty and the age-distribution of an MSA. 
Table 13: Hybrid Model for Proportion of Household Property Crimes that are Co-
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p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*, p<.10† 
*Time trends are included in the models, however are not presented in the results.  
 
Table 14 presents the results for the proportion of personal instrumental crimes 
that are co-offenses using the unemployment rate as the measure of economic hardship. 
Inconsistent with the expected relationships hypothesized in Hypothesis 2a and 4a, there 
are no statistically significant relationships between the long-and short-term effects 
associated with increases in the unemployment rate and the proportion of personal 
instrumental crimes that are co-offenses. It is possible that certain types of crime, such as 
household property crime, tend to involve multiple offenders for reasons that are not 
observed in personal instrumental crimes, such as robbery. Of note, the percentage of an 
MSA that is black emerges as a consistently positive and significant predictor of the 
proportion of personal instrumental crimes that are co-offenses.  
Table 14: Hybrid Model for Proportion of Personal Instrumental Crimes that are 
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Percent Male -.040 .183 .075 -.317 .095 -.254 
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Unemployment Rate X 
Percent Aged 25-44 





p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*, p<.10† 
*Time trends are included in the models, however are not presented in the results.  
 
Table 15 presents the results for the proportion of personal instrumental crimes that 
are co-offenses using the percentage of poverty in an MSA as the measure of economic 
hardship. Again, inconsistent with the expected relationships hypothesized in Hypothesis 
2a and 4a, there are no statistically significant relationships between the long-and short-
term effects associated with increases in the unemployment rate and the proportion of 
personal instrumental crimes that are co-offenses for the baseline model. In the moderating 
models, there appears to be a moderating relationship between the percentage of the MSA 
that is between the ages 15 and 24 and the percentage of poverty. In particular, across 
MSAs a one-unit increase in the percentage of an MSA that is between the ages 15 and 24 
leads to an approximately 4.1% increase in the slope of the impact of the long-term effect 
of poverty. Consistent with the prior model, the percent Black in an MSA is also 
statistically significant and positively related to the proportion of personal instrumenta l 








Table 15: Hybrid Model for Proportion of Personal Instrumental Crimes that are 
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Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 25-44 





p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*, p<.10† 
*Time trends are included in the models, however are not presented in the results.  
 
The final set of results present the models that evaluate the relationship between 
the measures of economic hardship and the proportion of expressive crimes that are co-
offenses. Table 16 presents the results for the proportion of expressive crimes that are co-
offenses using the unemployment rate as the measure of economic hardship. Consistent 
with Hypothesis 2b, there is a null relationship between the long-term effect associated 
with motivation and the proportion of expressive crimes that are co-offenses. There was 
no reason to expect that there would be an increase in the motivation to commit 
expressive co-offending that would lead to a substantive shift in an offender’s willingness 
to take on co-offenders resulting in an increase in the proportion of these crimes 
committed in groups. In contrast to the expected positive relationship between the short-
term effect associated with unemployment and the proportion of expressive crimes that 
are co-offenses (Hypothesis 4b), there is not a statistically significant relationship in the 
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baseline model. Of note, the percentage of the MSA that is between the ages 25 and 44 
appears to moderate the relationship between the unemployment rate and the proportion 
of expressive crimes that are co-offenses. Across MSAs, a one-unit increase in the 
average percentage of an MSA-population between the ages 25 to 44 is associated with a 
4.4% increase in the expected slope of the long-term effect of unemployment on the 
proportion of expressive crimes that are co-offenses. None of the other control variables 
exhibit statistically significant relationships with the outcome.  
Table 16: Hybrid Model for Proportion of Expressive Crimes that are Co-offenses, 
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Unemployment Rate X 
Percent Aged 25-44 





p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*, p<.10† 
*Time trends are included in the models, however are not presented in the results.  
 
 Lastly, Table 17 presents the results for the models examining the relationship 
between the long-and short-term effects of poverty on the proportion of expressive crimes 
that are co-offenses. Consistent with Hypothesis 2b, there is a null relationship between 
the long-term effect associated with motivation and the proportion of expressive crimes 
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that are co-offenses. Additionally, there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship in the expected direction for the impact of the short-term effect associated 
with poverty and the proportion of expressive crimes that are co-offenses. Specifically, 
for every one-unit increase in the within-MSA percentage of poverty there is an expected 
10% increase in the proportion of expressive crimes that are co-offenses. There does not 
appear to be any moderating relationships between the age-distribution of the MSA and 
the percentage of poverty in an MSA on the outcome.  
Table 17: Hybrid Model for Proportion of Expressive Crimes that are Co-offenses, 
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 15-24 (18b) 
Interaction Model 
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Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 25-44 





p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*, p<.10† 
*Time trends are included in the models, however are not presented in the results.  
 
 As mentioned with the models evaluating the relationship between economic 
hardship and the rate of co-offending, in order to address some of the small sample sizes 
within each MSA in any given year, pooled analyses were conducted across 2 and 3 year 
increments replicating each of the models generated in the results above. Of note, the 
substantive findings found in the analyses utilizing annual estimates were almost entirely 
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replicated for each of the crime types and for each type of indicator of economic 
hardship. The replication of these findings address concerns that the results reported 
above were hampered or drastically impacted by instances of small sample size for 
certain MSAs. While these pooled results generally reflect the same substantive results, it 
becomes more difficult to interpret the meaning of long and short term effects when the 
time periods associated with these effects now extend to 2 and 3 year intervals. As a 
result, these results are not presented and are included as Appendix 3. 
 Table 18 presents an overall summary of whether empirical support is observed 
for each of the hypotheses of the current study across each indicator of economic 
hardship and whether the relationships are moderated by the age-distribution of the MSA. 
Because there are two categories of instrumental crime (i.e., household property, personal 
instrumental), Table 18 also denotes whether empirical support is observed for each of 
these crime types by specifying these crime types in parentheticals. As a reminder, it was 
also hypothesized that the moderating relationship would only be observed in instances 
where there was an expected positive and statistically significant relationship between 
economic hardship and the crime type outcome. Thus, for several hypotheses whether the 
relationship between economic hardship and co-offending was moderated by the age-
distribution of an MSA is not applicable and is denoted as such by ‘NA’.9 Still, in a few 
cases statistically significant relationships emerged for certain crime types and are 
therefore reported in parentheses. 
                                                                 
9 Although it was hypothesized that the age-profile of an MSA would not moderate all of the relationships 
between economic hardship and co-offending, for the purpose of providing consistent results across models 
these moderating relationships were included in the results. Additionally, it is possible for moderating 
relationships to occur even when main effects of certain covariates on an outcome do not emerge. The 
moderating relationships that are statistically significant provide a foundation for future work to co nsider 
the extent to which processes related to economic hardship matter differently across unique social and 
demographic contexts of a geographic area. 
98 
 
 Across both measures of economic hardship, several general conclusions can be 
drawn. Consistent with the expectation that there would be a positive relationship 
between economic hardship and instrumental crimes in the long term, there tends to be 
consistent evidence to indicate that the long-term effects of economic hardship led to a 
higher rate of instrumental forms of co-offending and in one instance (i.e., household 
property co-offending) a higher proportion of crimes that were co-offenses. This is 
supportive of the expected drive that experiencing economic hardship has on committing 
crimes with potential monetary gains that can supplement reduced or lost income (e.g., 
Cantor & Land, 1985). The fact that there was a long-term positive relationship between 
economic hardship and the proportion of household property crimes that were co-
offenses is also demonstrative of the potential shift in the distribution of individuals 
willing to engage in household property crime with the added utility of additional 
accomplices. As expected, there were null relationships between economic hardship and 
the rate and proportion outcomes for expressive co-offending in the long-term. There was 
limited reason to expect that more offenders would become motivated over time to 
engage in expressive co-offending because of experiencing economic hardship.  
 The overall findings for the relationship between the short-term effect of 
economic hardship and the co-offending outcomes provided some inconsistent evidence 
with the hypotheses. In general, there tended to be a strong positive relationship between 
economic hardship and the rate of instrumental and expressive co-offending in the short-
term. While this relationship was expected for expressive crimes due to the hypothesized 
increase in behavioral convergent spaces in the short-run, these results contrast the 
original hypotheses for instrumental crimes. In particular, it was expected that there 
99 
 
would be countervailing influences in the short-run that suppressed opportunities for all 
forms of instrumental crimes despite the added utility of taking on a co-offender in the 
face of a changing criminal target backcloth. The observed positive relationship in the 
short-run for the rate of both forms of instrumental crimes suggests that there may be a 
strong lure to engaging in instrumental crimes with other offenders that is acted on when 
offenders occupy spaces that provide concentrated accessibility to other accomplices. 
Lastly in the short-term, positive relationships between economic hardship and the 
proportion of household property crimes and expressive crimes that were co-offenses also 
emerged. Among instrumental crimes, this is consistent with the theoretical arguments 
that short-term changes in the opportunity structure for crime may lead offenders to 
engage in adaptive behavior towards co-offending to overcome the added risks and 
difficulties associated with increased guardianship and the reduction in the circulation of 
targets. As a result, there is a positive shift in the distribution of offenders engaging in 
household property co-offending relative to those engaging in this type of crime alone. 
The positive relationship in the short-term with the proportion of expressive crimes that 
were co-offenses is in line with the expectation that the increased availability of 
convergent spaces driven by the short-term changes of economic hardship would 
generate more opportunities for engaging in expressive forms of crimes with other 
offenders. In total, these findings provide supportive evidence for how long and short-





Table 18: Summary of Results 
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Moderated by Age 
Distribution 25-44 
(Y/N) 
(1) There will be a positive relationship between economic 
hardship and the rate of co-offending in the long-term. 
Unemployment 
Rate 
No No No 
Percent Poverty No No No 
(1a) There will be a positive relationship between economic 
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(2a) There will be a positive relationship between economic 
hardship and the proportion of instrumental crimes that are co-
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Percent Poverty Yes NA NA 
101 
 
(3) There will be a positive relationship between economic 




No No No 
Percent Poverty Yes No No 
(3a) There will be a positive relationship between economic 
hardship and the proportion of instrumental crimes that are co-










(3b) There will be a positive relationship between economic 
hardship and the proportion of expressive crimes that are co-
offenses in the short-term.  
Unemployment 
Rate 
No No No 
Percent Poverty Yes Yes No 
(4) There will be a null relationship between economic hardship 
and the rate of co-offending in the short-term. 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Yes NA NA 
Percent Poverty No  NA NA 
(4a) There will be a null relationship between economic hardship 


















(4b) There will be a positive relationship between economic 
hardship and the rate of expressive co-offending in the short-term. 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Yes No No 




CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
 
The notion that crime occurs within a social structure and context is arguably one 
of the most important tenants of criminological theory and research (e.g., Shaw & McKay, 
1942; Thrasher, 1927). To explain how social conditions facilitated criminal behavior, 
many theoretical perspectives elevated the role of criminal groups or subcultures and 
demonstrably stated that engaging in crime with others was essential to the acquisition of 
delinquent norms or behavior that maintained the concentration of crime in urban areas 
(e.g., Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Cohen, 1955; Short & Strodtbeck, 1965). Despite the fact 
that this early theoretical work suggested that socio-structural factors generated conditions 
conducive to offending with others, co-offending research was ultimately spearheaded by 
scholars most interested in understanding individual- level experiences of crimina l 
cooperation and how  involvement in co-offending impacted elements of a criminal career 
(e.g., Reiss, 1986, 1988). To advance the co-offending literature beyond an individual- leve l 
framework, this dissertation re-situated co-offending into context by examining how 
economic hardship was related to the emergence of co-offending. 
Specifically, this dissertation integrated the conceptual arguments proposed by 
Tremblay (1993) and Felson (2003) to develop an empirical model that tested how 
economic hardship facilitated aggregate level shifts in the motivation to engage in co-
offending and influenced opportunity structures for crime that make taking on accomplices 
a more viable option. Tremblay (1993) and Felson (2003) both identified the challenges 
associated with specifying consistent and stable explanations for the emergence of co-
offending. Felson (2003) contended that the unstable nature of gangs, unwieldy and 
unbounded nature of social friendship networks, and rapidly changing offender networks 
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cannot consistently explain how and why group offending occurs with such regular ity. 
Collectively, these scholars suggested that macro-level conditions facilitated motivation to 
engage in crime with others and generated behavioral convergent settings that enabled 
paths towards identifying suitable co-offenders. In line with a much broader empirica l 
background, Tremblay (1993) hypothesized explicitly that economic hardship - as 
measured by unemployment - generated an increased concentration of motivated offenders 
and altered the opportunity structure for crime such that engaging in crime with others was 
both more practical and viable for offenders. To evaluate these premises, this dissertation 
used aggregated victimization incidents at the MSA-level from the NCVS to understand 
how economic hardship, measured by both the unemployment rate and the percent of 
poverty in an MSA, were related to two outcomes – the rate of co-offending and the 
proportion of crimes that are co-offenses.  
The first conclusion from this dissertation is that both the long-and short-term 
processes associated with economic hardship were more likely to predict increases 
consistent with the proposed hypotheses for the rate of co-offending as opposed to the 
proportion of crimes that are co-offenses. As expected, motivation derived from the long-
term impact of increases in economic hardship tended to be consistently associated with 
increasing rates of instrumental forms of co-offending. The fact that offenders were more 
likely to engage in instrumental forms of co-offending continues to suggest that individua ls 
respond to economic hardship by engaging in illegal activity to supplement or replace lost 
income and make ends meet (e.g., Cantor & Land, 1985). Perhaps more importantly 
though, this finding extends Cantor and Land’s (1985) argument that the long-term impact 
of economic hardship shifts the density of the distribution of motivation to commit crime 
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among a population by further recognizing that this distribution is interdependently tied to 
a willingness to engage in crime with others. Prior co-offending work has explicitly argued 
that despite the inherent risks associated with taking on co-offending, the uncertaint ies 
surrounding changing conditions of economic or social adversity may directly impact the 
likelihood that individuals are motivated to engage in crime by incorporating an 
accomplice into the offending equation (e.g., McCarthy et al., 1998; Nguyen & McGloin, 
2013). The positive relationship between economic hardship and the rates of instrumenta l 
co-offending demonstrated that the overall volume of criminal incidents within an MSA 
increased relative to its population and suggested that economic hardship impacted the 
decision to co-offend for a relatively broad segment of the population. Although it is 
possible that a small percentage of the population increased the frequency that they co-
offended, prior work would suggest that the increased motivation impacted both 
individuals already motivated to engage in crime and those who would not normally do so 
but decide to engage in crime (e.g., McGloin and Rowan, 2015; Warr, 2002).  
Thus, motivational forces to engage in crime are not necessarily tied solely to an 
individual offender’s experience of adversity, but rather are a function of the 
interdependent experience of offenders being embedded within the same context. This 
argument is particularly important if we consider the relatively static view of motivat ion 
among prior theoretical perspectives that largely assume motivation to be a given or 
narrowly discussed as a construct among offenders who only ever engage in crime alone. 
The findings from this dissertation addressed Felson and Cohen’s (1980) call to consider 
how offender inclinations may be impacted by other offenders by underscoring the role 
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that macro-level conditions have in facilitating not just motivation to commit crime 
generally – but motivation that is explicitly tied to engaging in crime with others.  
The findings from this dissertation also provided insight into our understanding of 
the interplay between co-offending and opportunity structures for crime (Cohen and 
Felson, 1979). Despite prior evidence suggesting that a decline in criminal opportunities in 
the short-term was driven by added risks and reduced potential rewards associated with a 
changing criminal landscape, results from this dissertation demonstrated a positive increase 
in both instrumental and expressive rates of group crime (Cantor & Land, 1985; Phillips & 
Land, 2012). Although this is the first study to evaluate these relationships, it provided 
some important considerations to our understanding of offender responses to changing 
opportunity structures to crime. Specifically, while Cantor and Land (1985) argued that the 
contemporaneous impact of economic hardship increased the level of guardianship and 
reduced the circulation of quality goods, the observed short-term positive relationship for 
instrumental crimes suggests that the advantages in taking on co-offenders during times of 
economic hardship may provide added utility in the decision-making process to engage in 
crime. Further, the utility of taking on co-offenders is also accompanied in the short-run by 
an expected increase in the availability of behavioral convergent settings for individuals to 
identify and find a suitable co-offender. As Crutchfield (1989: 491) argued, areas 
characterized by high involvement in unstable secondary labor markets and high levels of 
unemployment generate conditions that leave many people “frequently idle in a ‘situation 
of company’” that is conducive to crime. Although Crutchfield (1989) did not explicit ly 
argue that the influx of situations of company may facilitate co-offending, his argument is 
consistent with the expectation that economic hardship increases the concentration of 
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potentially motivated criminal accomplices (Tremblay, 1993). This increased 
concentration among potential offenders can also explain the positive short-term effect of 
economic hardship on the rate of expressive group crime, as the presence of others has 
been demonstrated to provide the situational inducements necessary to enable individua ls 
to be more likely to engage in expressive or violent crime (e.g., McGloin & Piquero, 2009; 
McGloin & Thomas, 2016).  
Still, it is important to note that offender adaptation to changing economic 
conditions at the macro-level did not consistently translate into a shift in the overall 
proportion of crime that was committed by more than one offender. If the experience of 
economic hardship generated motivation and opportunities conducive to committing crime 
with others at a higher rate than among individuals committing crime alone, we would have 
observed significant increases in the proportion of crime committed by multiple offenders. 
This only emerged for household property crime, suggesting that a willingness to work 
with others may be particularly important for criminal acts where increased guardianship 
may be most likely to occur. Indeed, D’Alessio, Eitle, and Stolzenberg (2012) 
demonstrated that increasing levels of unemployment resulted in a contemporaneous 
decline in residential burglaries that occurred during normal working hours, when 
individuals previously spent time away from home. Qualitative evidence from Wright and 
Decker’s (1997) interviews with active residential burglars provided some support for the 
importance of co-offenders by serving as look-outs and assisting if unanticipated resistance 
from guardians occurred. Thus, the positive relationships that emerged for household 
property co-offending may be reflective of offenders leveraging co-offenders as resources 
to overcome the added risks associated with household property crime. The overall lack of 
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statistically significant relationships to the proportion of crimes that are co-offenses for 
other crime types may further reflect the dynamic relationship between economic hardship 
and all forms of crime – solo and group – that is not readily captured in one year time 
periods (e.g., Greenberg, 2001). Shifts in the proportion of crime that are co-offenses may 
be more responsive to immediate changes in the opportunity structure for crime that may 
not be readily captured by using annual estimates of the state of economic conditions.  
The second major conclusion from this dissertation concerns the extent to which 
the methodological and conceptual specification of the analytic approach used in this 
dissertation extends our understanding of the macro-level relationship between economic 
hardship and co-offending. Since Cantor and Land’s (1985) seminal article, scholars have 
often misinterpreted their study as a relationship between the unemployment and crime 
(e.g., Greenberg, 2001); however, Cantor and Land (2001: 332) explicitly argued that the 
“unemployment rate represents changes to macroeconomic conditions” and was meant to 
serve as a proxy of the state of the economy. In support of this claim, this dissertation 
continued the trend of scholarly work to evaluate the proposed relationships utilizing 
multiple indicators of economic hardship (e.g., Arvanites & Defina, 2006). The percentage 
of poverty within an MSA was chosen in part because it captures families whose financ ia l 
income was likely a function of poor or lack of employment status, but also served as a 
measure of economic hardship that was not dependent on being categorized as belonging 
to the labor force. Interestingly, many of the relationships described earlier were driven by 
the long-and short-term effects associated with increases in poverty and were often not 
observed in the models utilizing unemployment rate as a measure of economic hardship. 
This should not lead to the conclusion that the unemployment rate cannot explain the 
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emergence of group crime, but rather illustrates that the experience of economic hardship 
may be most salient for promoting a willingness to cooperate and for generating conditions 
that make group crime a seemingly practical decision. For instance, McCarthy et al.’s 
(1998) conclusion that adversity led to an increased willingness to engage in crime with 
others was based on a scale of adversity that included 1) going a whole day without eating, 
or 2) going a whole day without sleeping in or on a bus, restaurant, park, or street. Although 
unemployment may be highly correlated with these experiences, the fact that the 
unemployment rate does not include individuals who have essentially become discouraged 
or ‘dropped out’ of the labor market may not be capturing the true extent of experiencing 
economic hardship that is more likely to promote criminal cooperation (BLS, 2014). The 
differences in the findings across the measures of economic hardship suggest that future 
work should continue to consider how criminal cooperation may be dependent on the type 
of adversity that potential offenders experience.  
Relatedly, the reification of the unemployment rate as the measure of economic 
hardship has also led to significant debate over understanding the segment of the population 
that such a measure applies to (Cantor and Land, 2001; Greenberg, 2001). To evaluate the 
extent to which macroeconomic changes captured by the unemployment rate and 
percentage of poverty in an MSA have an impact on more than just those individuals or 
families that become unemployed or are under the poverty level threshold, tests for whether 
the age-distribution of an MSA moderated these relationships were conducted. This 
arguably improves upon prior work which has only explicitly looked at whether rates of 
unemployment by age-groups are related to crime because it attempts to evaluate whether 
measures of economic hardship interact with the segments of the population that 
109 
 
theoretically would be subject to the experience of an economic downturn. Although the 
results from this dissertation demonstrated mixed findings with respect to when the age-
distribution of an MSA moderated the relationship of economic hardship, there was more 
consistent evidence for MSAs with greater percentages of individuals between the ages of 
15 to 24 years old to have a stronger impact of economic hardship on both rates of co-
offending and in some instances the proportion of crimes that are co-offenses. This finding 
is consistent with prior research indicating that the prevalence of co-offending peaked 
during adolescence and declines in adulthood (e.g., Reiss & Farrington, 1991) and research 
that suggested the impact of unemployment was most salient among young adults who 
were denied entry into the adult labor market. While speculative, these findings provide 
preliminary support for the fact that MSAs with more of-crime aged individuals (and 
arguably more prone to be involved in group crime) are most responsive to changing 
economic conditions that motivate individuals to take on co-offenders and generate 
conditions that make co-offending a viable option. There was some evidence that the 
relationship between economic hardship and expressive group crime was moderated by the 
percent of the MSA that was between the ages of 25 and 44 years old, which may be 
consistent with Crutchfield (1989) and Tremblay’s (1993) arguments that the influx of 
people most likely to be involved in the labor market are now unemployed and 
concentrated in space and time. This concentration, in addition to the strained experience 
due to economic hardship, may facilitate an increase in expressive or violent crime given 
the impact that the presence of others have on providing the necessary inducements to 




Limitations and Future Directions 
 
Despite the strengths of this dissertation, there are several limitations worth 
consideration. As with any dataset, the use of NCVS carries several analytical and 
conceptual issues. In order to capture incidents of group crime within the NCVS, the 
sampling strategy required the use of respondents who had valid data on whether or not 
they saw offender. This additional layer of sample selection further reduced the number of 
actual respondents within an MSA that could be used to generate MSA-level estimates of 
the rate of group crime and proportion of group crime incidents, which may limit the 
accuracy of the estimates and generalizability of the findings. To provide robustness checks 
for the analyses, pooled regression models for two and three year intervals were conducted 
to essentially increase the number of observations within each MSA. Findings from these 
supplemental analyses confirmed the results from the main models using annual estimates. 
Additionally, although the NCVS captures crimes unreported to the police that are 
excluded from studies using official data, the NCVS does not include estimates of several 
crime types including homicide and crime at commercial businesses. To the extent that 
differences in the likelihood that these crime types are more likely to be committed by more 
than one offender as a result of changing economic conditions, the results within this 
dissertation may vary when compared to studies that utilize official police records. It is 
also the case that the NCVS utilizes a hierarchy rule, such that if a victimization incident 
could be classified as more than one type of crime there is an ordered decision process to 
determine the final crime classification. For example, if a victimization involved both 
burglary and assault it would be classified as an assault.  Thus, the substantive distinct ion 
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between instrumental and expressive crimes becomes a bit blurred and may lead to an 
overestimation of the rate and proportion of expressive crimes that are co-offenses.  
Lastly, the examination of co-offending in this dissertation was devised by a 
relatively crude distinction of whether or not a victim reported seeing one or more than one 
offender. This was chosen because there is substantial missing data in the follow-up survey 
questions asked of respondents regarding the number of offenders, demographic 
characteristics about the offender, whether the offender(s) appeared to be using drugs, and 
whether the victim knew the offender. While it would be ideal to understand the extent to 
which the relationship between economic hardship and group crime was driven by certain 
types of offenders or characteristics about offenders, to avoid the ability to make reasonable 
inferences about the nature of co-offending in these victimization experiences this 
dissertation only examined the binary distinction of whether or not more than one offender 
was involved. In an effort to try to contextualize the findings in terms of differences in the 
form of co-offending that may be related to variation in offender motivation, models using 
different crime type outcomes were used. 
 Recent work within criminology that examines the role of place in explaining crime 
has demonstrated the importance of smaller units of micro-places (e.g., Eck & Weisburd, 
1995; Groff, Weisburd, & Yang, 2010). In general, the concentration of crime and 
persistence of crime that occurs at the micro-level (e.g., block, street segment) suggests 
that the processes which facilitate criminal behavior are localized and systematica l ly 
related to the opportunity structures defined at the micro-level. This dissertation utilized 
MSA-level data, which arguably may be too broad of a geographic unit to capture how 
economic hardship alters the interaction among offenders and target backcloth that would 
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facilitate group offending. While this is an obvious limitation, the fact that statistica l ly 
significant relationships emerged at the MSA-level suggests that future work that is 
consistent with efforts that refine the geographic unit of analysis to lower levels of 
aggregation may be warranted to better understand the nature of localized processes 
relevant for explaining group crime.  
Relatedly, the current analyses did not explicitly have measures of motivation to 
engage in group crime or opportunity structures for crime. Instead, it adopted a statistica l 
method that distinguished differences in long-and short-term effects that were expected to 
be related to increases in economic hardship and hypothesized to be related to the concepts 
of motivation and opportunity (e.g., Andresen, 2012). This approach has been utilized in 
prior evaluations of the relationship between crime and economic hardship, however, 
clearly overlooks the possibility that these short-and long-term effects are capturing factors 
other than motivation or opportunity (e.g., Andresen, 2012, 2015; Andresen & Linning, 
2015). Although this is a potential challenge associated with most macro-level research 
that utilizes aggregate level data (i.e., socioeconomic status, racial heterogeneity) to tap 
into processes that are theoretically associated with such measures, it may be worth 
exploring whether there are measures that are more strongly tied to the constructs of 
motivation and opportunity.  
Beyond these limitations, this dissertation serves to help substantively advance our 
understanding of co-offending and offers a number of avenues for future research. Among 
the few studies that have been conducted that consider group crime at the macro-level, 
analytical and substantive flaws limit the ability of the studies to draw completely valid 
conclusions on the relationship between certain macro-level factors and group crime. The 
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results further reinforce that long-and short-term processes attributed to increases in 
economic hardship are not only related to crime, but also facilitates co-offending among 
offenders. Thus, prior research examining the relationship between economic hardship and 
crime may be missing a key substantive distinction in the outcome of crime that actually 
lead to in some instances different conclusions about the relationship between motivat ion 
for and opportunity structures to commit group crime. 
Further, this dissertation demonstrated the utility of using victimization data to 
study co-offending and can be viewed as an example for additional work to consider a 
macro-level evaluation of group crime that addresses many of the limitations of offic ia l 
records. The limited availability of data that capture group crime must lead scholars 
interested in this form of criminal behavior to adopt creative approaches to studying co-
offending. The NCVS offers a potential resource as a widely available dataset for scholar’s 
to promote a co-offending research agenda.  Lastly, this analytic strategy adopted in this 
dissertation provides an extension of Cantor and Land’s (1985) original crime -
unemployment model through the utilization of a hybrid modeling strategy proposed by 
Andresen (2012) to specifically consider multiple outcomes of group crime.  
This dissertation should contribute to developing a future research agenda that 
continues to explore how co-offending is embedded into context and also more generally 
understand the process of co-offending. The main macro-level condition that was focused 
on in this dissertation was economic hardship, which while theoretically and empirica l ly 
grounded in prior research is not the only macro-level condition that likely affects the 
emergence of group crime. For instance, Schaefer et al. (2014) provided some evidence to 
suggest that while collective efficacy is generally related to a reduction in crime, it has the 
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inadvertent effect of promoting trust among individuals within social networks that 
facilities co-offending relationships. Identifying other constructs related to the formation 
of trust, including measures of collective efficacy or measures of trust found in the General 
Social Survey, and merging them into the NCVS may prove to demonstrate the unintended 
consequences of a traditionally crime-reducing macro-level factor. Additionally, research 
interested in understanding the nexus between crime rates and immigration have 
demonstrated that that areas that experience an increased concentration of immigrants tend 
to actually report lower rates of crime (e.g., Martinez, Jr., Stowell, & Lee, 2010; Stowell, 
Messner, McGeever, & Raffalovich, 2009; Wadsworth, 2010). Perhaps the strong network 
and families ties associated with a new wave of immigrants into an area similarly promote 
trust among informal networks that inadvertently promote group offending (e.g., Portes et 
al., 2009; Portes & Zhou, 1993). By examining the relationship between dimensions of 
immigration concentration across areas, this may explain some of the systematic 
differences in the emergence of group crime and could provide additional context to 
understanding the development of offending patterns among immigrants. 
 In addition to exploring multiple measures of macro-level factors that may help 
explain the emergence of co-offending, multi- level approaches that integrate an 
understanding of both the contextual and individual level factors that facilitate co-
offending among potential offenders would also be beneficial. The complex process by 
which offenders take on accomplices is arguably driven by both individual and contextual 
level explanatory factors. For instance, it may be the case that individuals who experience 
adversity or become unemployed may be more willing to co-offend (e.g., McCarthy et al., 
1998), however, systematic differences in economic hardship across various contexts may 
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differentiate accessibility and availability to the conditions that facilitate co-offending.  
Short and Strotdbeck (1965) alluded to this type of argument early on by stating that the 
criminal group represented the intersection of both individual and macro-level factors, 
therefore, it is prudent for scholars to identify or collect data that enable a multi- leve l 
framework to develop theoretical explanations and empirical tests for the study of co-
offending.  
One of the major premises of this dissertation and of the work that inspired it is that 
behavioral convergent settings offer stable contexts for which offenders can use to identify 
and socialize with suitable co-offenders (e.g., Felson, 2003). This dissertation begins to 
places bounds on understanding how macro-level factors generate conditions more 
favorable to group crime, however, does not address how offenders identify these 
convergent settings. One direction for future research may be to consider the domain or 
location that multiple offender victimizations occur. For example, Bichler, Malm, and 
Enriquez (2014) utilize network analysis among a sample of delinquent youth to identify 
self-nominated ‘magnetic’ hangout spaces that promote the concentration of youth in space 
that are conducive to crime. It will be important as scholars continue to understand how 
behavioral convergent settings emerge, where these settings are and how they evolve under 
changing socio-structural conditions. Alternatively, if convergent settings are generated 
through the routines and patterns of individuals, utilizing street-network or connectivity 
data would provide an opportunity to explore both where concentration of likely offenders 
is most probable and the ease in which offenders would be able converge in space. It is my 
hope that scholars continue to investigate how context matters for understanding the 




Appendix A: List of MSAs included in NCVS Data 




Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC 
Chicago, IL 
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN 





Fort Lauderdale, FL 
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 
Houston, TX 
Kansas City, MO-KS 
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 
Miami, FL 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 
Nassau-Suffolk, NY 
New York, NY 
Newark, NJ 







Riverside-San Bernardino, CA 
Sacramento, CA 
St. Louis, MO-IL 
San Antonio, TX 
San Diego, CA 
San Francisco, CA 
San Jose, CA 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 
Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 
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Appendix B: Supplemental Analyses  
Alternative Specifications of Proportion Outcomes  
Table 19: Supplemental Analyses, Overall Proportion of Crimes that are Co-
offenses – Unemployment Rate N=540 
p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*, p<.10† 
 
 Untransformed Continuous 
Outcome 




























      
















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  .005 
(.017) 
  .024 
(.056) 
Unemployment Rate 
X Percent Aged 15-24 
 -.003 
(.004) 




X Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.001 
(.003) 
  -.005 
(.011) 
    


















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.017 
(.013) 
  -.080 
(.073) 
Unemployment Rate 
X Percent Aged 15-24 
 .005* 
(.006) 




X Percent Aged 25-44 
  .002 
(.002) 
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Table 20: Supplemental Analyses, Overall Proportion of Crimes that are Co-
offenses - Percent Poverty N=540 







 Untransformed Continuous 
Outcome 




























      


















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.008 
(.015) 
  -.048 
(.079) 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 15-24 
 .002 
(.003) 
  .010 
(.014) 
 
Percent Poverty  X 
Percent Aged 25-44 
  .001 
(.001) 
  .003 
(.007) 
    


















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.022 
(.014) 
  -.105 
(.076) 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 15-24 
 .001 
(.002) 
  .007 
(.009) 
 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 25-44 
  .002 
(.001) 




Table 21: Supplemental Analyses, Proportion of Household Property Crimes that 
are Co-offenses – Unemployment Rate N=474 
p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*, p<.10† 
 
 Untransformed Continuous 
Outcome 




























      


















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  .019 
(.020) 
   
Unemployment Rate 
X Percent Aged 15-24 
 .002 
(.004) 




X Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.004 
(.004) 
  -.023 
(.022) 
    


















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.034 
(.023) 
  -.187 
(.130) 
Unemployment Rate 
X Percent Aged 15-24 
 .008 
(.006) 




X Percent Aged 25-44 
  .006* 
(.003) 




Table 22: Supplemental Analyses, Proportion of Household Property Crimes that 
are Co-offenses - Percent Poverty N=474 







 Untransformed Continuous 
Outcome 




























      


















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.005 
(.020) 
  -.030 
(.111) 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 15-24 
 .001 
(.003) 
  .002 
(.016) 
 
Percent Poverty  X 
Percent Aged 25-44 
  .001 
(.002) 
  .003 
(.009) 
    


















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.018 
(.021) 
  -.082 
(.127) 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 15-24 
 .001 
(.003) 
  -.002 
(.019) 
 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 25-44 
  .001 
(.001) 




Table 23: Supplemental Analyses, Proportion of Personal Instrumental Crimes that 
are Co-offenses – Unemployment Rate N=533 
p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*, p<.10† 
 
 Untransformed Continuous 
Outcome 




























      


















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  .009 
(.022) 
  .039 
(.092) 
Unemployment Rate 
X Percent Aged 15-24 
 .001 
(.001) 




X Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.001 
(.003) 
  -.006 
(.014) 
    


















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.024 
(.035) 
  -.101 
(.147) 
Unemployment Rate 
X Percent Aged 15-24 
 .001 
(.008) 




X Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.001 
(.003) 




Table 24: Supplemental Analyses, Proportion of Personal Instrumental Crimes that 
are Co-offenses - Percent Poverty N=533 







 Untransformed Continuous 
Outcome 




























      


















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.008 
(.035) 
  -.038 
(.147) 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 15-24 
 .007* 
(.003) 
  .030* 
(.013) 
 
Percent Poverty  X 
Percent Aged 25-44 
  .001 
(.003) 
  .005 
(.012) 
    


















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.027 
(.035) 
  -.110 
(.147) 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 15-24 
 .005 
(.004) 
  .026† 
(.016) 
 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 25-44 
  .001 
(.002) 




Table 25: Supplemental Analyses, Proportion of Expressive Crimes that are Co-
offenses – Unemployment Rate N=450 
p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*, p<.10† 
 
 Untransformed Continuous 
Outcome 




























      


















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.032* 
(.013) 
  -.187* 
(.086) 
Unemployment Rate 
X Percent Aged 15-24 
 .003 
(.004) 




X Percent Aged 25-44 
  .006** 
(.002) 
  .038* 
(.016) 
    


















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  .019 
(.020) 
  .150 
(.117) 
Unemployment Rate 
X Percent Aged 15-24 
 .003 
(.004) 




X Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.003 
(.002) 




Table 26: Supplemental Analyses, Proportion of Expressive Crimes that are Co-
offenses - Percent Poverty N=450 








 Untransformed Continuous 
Outcome 




























      


















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.004 
(.014) 
  -.011 
(.080) 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 15-24 
 -.004† 
(.002) 
  -.026† 
(.016) 
 
Percent Poverty  X 
Percent Aged 25-44 
  .001 
(.001) 
  .001 
(.007) 
    


















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.009 
(.019) 
  -.033 
(.114) 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 15-24 
 .005 
(.003) 
  .030 
(.020) 
 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 25-44 
  .001 
(.001) 




Pooled Supplemental Analyses 
 
Table 27: Pooled Supplemental Analyses, Rate of Household Property Co-offending 
-  Unemployment Rate  
p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*, p<.10† 
 




























      































































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.008 
(.086) 
  .002 
(.096) 
Unemployment Rate 
X Percent Aged 15-24 
 -.020 
(.027) 




X Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.007 
(.017) 
  -.007 
(.018) 
    































































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.045 
(.099) 
  -.047 
(.093) 
Unemployment Rate 
X Percent Aged 15-24 
 .026 
(.017) 




X Percent Aged 25-44 
  .003 
(.011) 




Table 28: Pooled Supplemental Analyses, Rate of Household Property Co-offending 
– Percent Poverty  

































      































































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.046 
(.064) 
  -.035 
(.069) 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 15-24 
 .001 
(.011) 
  .002 
(.012) 
 
Percent Poverty  X 
Percent Aged 25-44 
  .001 
(.006) 
  .001 
(.006) 
    































































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.082 
(.108) 
  -.043 
(.095) 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 15-24 
 -.001 
(.013) 
  -.011 
(.013) 
 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 25-44 
  .005 
(.008) 




Table 29: Pooled Supplemental Analyses, Rate of Personal Instrumental Co-
offending – Unemployment Rate  
p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*, p<.10† 
 




























      































































Percent Aged 25-44 
  .074 
(.085) 
  .072 
(.084) 
Unemployment Rate 
X Percent Aged 15-24 
 .003 
(.027) 




X Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.008 
(.017) 
  -.005 
(.017) 
    































































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.063 
(.092) 
  -.131 
(.089) 
Unemployment Rate 
X Percent Aged 15-24 
 .007 
(.017) 




X Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.006 
(.010) 




Table 30: Pooled Supplemental Analyses, Rate of Personal Instrumental Co-
offending Groups – Percent Poverty  

































      































































Percent Aged 25-44 
  .021 
(.071) 
  .005 
(.068) 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 15-24 
 .035*** 
(.010) 
  .037*** 
(.010) 
 
Percent Poverty  X 
Percent Aged 25-44 
  .001 
(.006) 
  .003 
(.006) 
    































































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.110 
(.101) 
  -.141 
(.093) 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 15-24 
 .007 
(.013) 
  .012 
(.013) 
 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 25-44 
  .002 
(.007) 




Table 31: Pooled Supplemental Analyses, Rate of Expressive Crime Committed in 
Groups - Unemployment Rate  
p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*, p<.10† 
 




























      































































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.129 
(.101) 
  -.109 
(.095) 
Unemployment Rate 
X Percent Aged 15-24 
 .051† 
(.028) 




X Percent Aged 25-44 
  .031 
(.020) 
  .025 
(.018) 
    































































Percent Aged 25-44 
  .086 
(.102) 
  .092 
(.103) 
Unemployment Rate 
X Percent Aged 15-24 
 -.023 
(.018) 




X Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.002 
(.011) 




Table 32: Pooled Supplemental Analyses, Rate of Personal Instrumental Co-
offending – Percent Poverty  

































      































































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.006 
(.081) 
  -.007 
(.070) 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 15-24 
 -.022 
(.014) 
    
Percent Poverty  X 
Percent Aged 25-44 






    































































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.015 
(.111) 
  -.062 
(.107) 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 15-24 
 .001 
(.014) 
  .013 
(.014) 
 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 25-44 
  .010 
(.008) 




Table 33: Pooled Supplemental Analyses, Proportion of Household Property Crimes 
that are Co-offenses - Unemployment Rate  
p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*, p<.10† 
 




























      


















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  .010 
(.110) 
  .034 
(.109) 
Unemployment Rate 
X Percent Aged 15-24 
 -.026 
(.031) 




X Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.016 
(.019) 
  -.014 
(.019) 
    


















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.199 
(.183) 
  -.186 
(.135) 
Unemployment Rate 
X Percent Aged 15-24 
 .041 
(.027) 




X Percent Aged 25-44 
  .009 
(.024) 




Table 34: Pooled Supplemental Analyses, Proportion of Household Property Crimes 
that are Co-offenses – Percent Poverty  





































      


















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.139† 
(.075) 
  .078 
(.064) 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 15-24 
 .006 
(.018) 
  -.008 
(.012) 
 
Percent Poverty  X 
Percent Aged 25-44 
  .007 
(.007) 
  .004 
(.006) 
    


















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.239 
(.216) 
  -.161 
(.155) 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 15-24 
 .007 
(.021) 
  -.010 
(.020) 
 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 25-44 
  .009 
(.012) 




Table 35: Pooled Supplemental Analyses, Proportion of Personal Instrumental 
Crimes that are Co-offenses - Unemployment Rate  
p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*, p<.10† 
 




























      


















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  .393† 
(.221) 
  .390* 
(.197) 
Unemployment Rate 
X Percent Aged 15-24 
 -.125* 
(.062) 
  -.066  
Unemployment Rate 
X Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.095* 
(.045) 
  -.074† 
(.039) 
    


















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  .196 
(.250) 
  -.132 
(.279) 
Unemployment Rate 
X Percent Aged 15-24 
 -.039 
(.046) 




X Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.031 
(.026) 




Table 36: Pooled Supplemental Analyses, Proportion of Personal Instrumental 
Crimes that are Co-offenses – Percent Poverty  





































      


















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.064 
(.182) 
  -.107 
(.163) 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 15-24 
 .087*** 
(.024) 
  .085*** 
(.017) 
 
Percent Poverty  X 
Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.003 
(.016) 
  .010 
(.014) 
    


















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  .130 
(.237) 
  -.042 
(.245) 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 15-24 
 -.007 
(.024) 
  -.016 
(.029) 
 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.012 
(.011) 




Table 37: Pooled Supplemental Analyses, Proportion of Expressive Crimes that are 
Co-offenses - Unemployment Rate  
p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*, p<.10† 
 




























      


















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.313* 
(.151) 
  -.147 
(.092) 
Unemployment Rate 
X Percent Aged 15-24 
 .142** 
(.046) 




X Percent Aged 25-44 
  .075* 
(.030) 
  .034* 
(.017) 
    


















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  .035 
(.284) 
  .094 
(.165) 
Unemployment Rate 
X Percent Aged 15-24 
 -.079† 
(.045) 




X Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.007 
(.038) 




Table 38:  Pooled Supplemental Analyses, Proportion of Expressive Crimes that are 
Co-offenses – Percent Poverty  


































      


















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.014 
(.147) 
  -.021 
(.109) 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 15-24 
 -.027 
(.032) 
  -.017 
(.025) 
 
Percent Poverty  X 
Percent Aged 25-44 
  .008 
(.013) 
  .004 
(.010) 
    
















































Percent Aged 25-44 
  -.160 
(.247) 
  -.129 
(.143) 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 15-24 
 .003 
(.036) 
  .015 
(.018) 
 
Percent Poverty X 
Percent Aged 25-44 
  .018 
(.020) 
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